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VIOLENCE - LEGAL JUSTIFICATION AND
MORAL APPRAISAL
by
R. Kent Greenawalt*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Thought about a "Right to Violence," the subject of this symposium, is difficult. Once one has adjusted to the paradoxical conjunction of the terms "right" and "violence," and recognized that
people may have rights to commit violent acts in some circumstances, one must face the disturbing fact that feelings about violence are highly colored by peculiar psychological dispositions and
political ideologies. Especially in respect to violence that is committed in defiance of law, the search for fair bases of moral judgment proves elusive.
The main theme of this essay is that the law itself can provide
illuminating points of reference for moral evaluation of illegal violence. The heart of this theme is that the ordinary rules governing
use of physical force on behalf of oneself and others reflect a range
of implicit moral judgments concerning the kinds of rights or interests that warrant protection by violent acts and the circumstances
in which such acts are appropriate. These judgments may be employed to evaluate the much less common and more controversial
claims that illegal force is justified. Before actually carrying out
this exercise, I need to describe its dimensions and limits more
carefully, as well as to consider what it may hope to accomplish
and to answer possible criticisms that it is radically misconceived.
That effort follows some preliminary clarifications about the senses
of "violence" and "right" that are employed here.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law. A.B.,
Swarthmore College, 1958; B. Phil., Oxford University, 1960; LL.M., Columbia University,
1963. I am grateful to Bruce Ackerman and Stephen Presser for very helpful criticisms of
earlier drafts of this essay; to the other members of the symposium at Emory Law School,
whose comments contributed to the final draft; to Timothy Terrell and the editors of this
law review, whose planning of the symposium provided the immediate impetus for this
thought and work; and to the Richard Lounsbery Foundation, whose generous assistance
has enabled me to undertake broad research into the subject of conflicts of law and morality, of which this essay is a part.
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Definitions and Preliminary Clarifications

A.

1.

Violence

The crucial problems about defining violence are two: whether
the term is to be understood in some value neutral sense or as representing a condemnatory judgment; and how broad is the ambit of
harm-inflicting activities that the term reaches. Violence has its
roots in two Latin words, violentus, meaning vehement and forcible, and violare, to injure or violate; the two notions of "great
physical force" and "unlawful force" carry over as modern senses
of violence. In ordinary usage, people may call an act of great force
"violent" even if they approve it - the police officer who shoots a
fleeing murderer has committed justified violence. For lesser force,
such as spanking, the label "violent" tends to imply condemnation.
Matters are further complicated by differences of context in which
'the term appears: "A performed a violent act" does not by itself
invoke a value judgment in quite the same manner as "A did violence to B.m These subtle shifts and other complexities2 hardly
yield a concept easily employed for intellectual inquiry. Using a
term in some circumstances to make a normative judgment about
force and using it in others purely descriptively would be awkward,
and drawing the line between the apt occasions for each of the uses
would be complicated.
What is needed here is usage that either always incorporates an
explicit value judgment or one that never does. Since the focus
here is on the really serious acts of physical force that are called
violent even when they are thought to be justified, the latter usage
is preferable, particularly since that usage does not render the
phrase "Right to Violence" self-contradictory' as well as paradoxi1

Holmes, Violence and Nonviolence, in VIOLENCE 110-12 (J. Schaffer ed. 1971).
One speaks of violent emotions, dispositions, and persons, as well as violent acts. Peter Macky suggests that the adjective "violent" differs crucially in meaning from the noun
"violence." P. MACKY, VIOLENCE: RIGHT OR WRONG? 18 (1973). His essay, and those contained in VIOLENCE, supra note 1, have helpful discussions of definitions of violence.
8
One using violence as a term of condemnation could, of course, say that under one set
of normative standards (e.g., those of correct moral judgment) an act regarded as violent
under a different set of normative standards (e.g., law or prevailing social morality) is actually proper, but within any single set of standards an act could never be justified and
violent.
2
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cal. This approach has the further advantage of being employed by
the three other authors in this symposium, none of whom speak of
violent acts as being necessarily wrong. Nonetheless, because specifying this meaning of "violence" cannot eliminate all the negative
connotations that go with the term, this essay generally eschews its
use in favor of less freighted concepts, such as serious physical
force, or more specific descriptions of action, such as killing. This
practice helps avoid prejudgment whether acts traditionally associated with violence are really worse than other harms that befall
human beings at the hands of their fellows.
The second major definitional question about violence is the
range of actions that the concept covers. About extreme physical
force no doubt exists, but what of psychological persecution or a
social and economic order that produces impoverishment of body
or spirit? Are these instances of violence? Violence has such a bad
name that those who place a very high value on physical security
are likely to favor a narrow definition; those wishing to emphasize
the magnitude of other harms want to stretch the label. It is unnecessary here to explore the possible merits of broader concepts
of violence, since the focus of this essay is on acts by individuals
against other individuals or against the government that have been
traditionally and are now commonly considered to be violent.
These include acts of force against persons that cause substantial
physical pain or impairment of physical faculties or that restrain
physical liberty for a significant period of time, and acts of force
against property that destroy or gravely impair its physical integrity. This catalogue is no doubt rather rough;' but it plainly
reaches the kinds of acts immediately brought to mind by the notion of a right to violence.
Though acts recklessly risking harm may be violent, most issues
about violence involve the infliction of harm that the actor attempts to cause or knows he will cause. I shall limit myself to such
situations. Among intentional inflictions of harm, I shall not discuss use of physical force that is voluntarily agreed to by the per• A more precise categorization is achieved by Ronald B. Miller in Violence, Force and
Coercion, in VIOLENCE, supra note 1, at 15-27.
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son against whom it is used, or that is employed with the reasonable assumption that it would be agreed to if the person were
conscious of its possible use. 15
2. Right

As has often been noted, "right" is a complex concept with different meanings. To say that someone has a right to perform an
act may mean that others have a duty not to interfere; it may
mean that performance of the act is legally or morally justified; or
it may mean that the person properly followed his conscientious
judgment about that act, even if the conscientious judgment was
wrong: Often the features of noninterference and justification will
coalesce, but they may diverge. Parents (within limits) may have a
moral right against outside interference to discipline their children,
but some instances of this discipline may be unjustified. Prisoners
may be justified in attempting to escape if remaining in prison will
subject them to serious harm from fellow prisoners, but guards
may be justified in trying to stop them from escaping. The central
question about physical force is when is its use justified? 6 This essay concentrates on that and does not assume that "right" in the
sense of legal or moral justification necessarily implies that interference would be wrong.
B. Legal Rules and Moral Appraisals
This section develops a more detailed analysis of how an investigation of the law can illumine moral appraisal of illegal acts of violence. This analysis includes a fuller general account of the relationship between accepted legal standards and moral evaluation,
and an outline of some specific issues about violence that the law
The essay thus excludes not only ordinary surgery but also instances of consent to
homicide and to sadistic acts.
6
When violence is employed against the state, its legal power to respond will generally
be assumed, and it will have a strong inclination to respond. An existing government may
well acknowledge that it should accommodate certain claims to disobey laws. See generally
Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality• Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REv.
177 (1981). It will rarely acknowledge, however, that violence directed against it does not
warrant a response. Thus, discussion of whether the state is morally justified in responding
is of limited practical significance.
6
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and moral judgment address. In the course of the discussion, responses are made to a variety of objections that might be raised to
the fruitfulness of the endeavor.
1.

The Initial Assumption - The Law of Justifiable Force As
Reflective of Moral Judgments

AB Oliver Wendell Holmes so eloquently put it, "The law is the
witness and external deposit of our moral life."7 What the law allows and forbids corresponds closely with what is viewed as morally acceptable and unacceptable. This general truth has specific
application to the law governing the use of physical force. Serious
physical force directed at other persons or their property usually
constitutes both a crime and a civil wrong, but the law contains a
set of privileges that justifies force that would otherwise be illegal.
The privileges contained in the common law of tort correspond
rather closely with the privileges of the criminal law, on which this
essay will concentrate; these latter receive statutory definition in
some jurisdictions and are left for judicial development in others.
The law of privileges deals with four major questions that are central for any moral evaluation of physical force. (1) What kinds of
rights and interests may people protect by the use of moderate or
extreme physical force? (2) How far may outsiders use physical
force to protect the rights and interests of others? (3) Against
whom may protective physical force be used? (4) How far is the
otherwise permissible use of force constrained by standards of necessity, or other limits? In respect to all these questions, the thesis
developed is that the settled judgments of the law highlight the
moral assumptions of our society.8 Much less directly, the law may
also help to explain society's approach to more general and abstract moral problems, such as the respective places of deontological reasoning (i.e., reasoning addressed to rights and duties) and
calculations of consequences.
Even in respect to the very subjects it addresses, the law does
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
See generally Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal Law,
64 CALIF. L. REV. 871 (1976), for an article that powerfully makes connections of the kind
suggested here.
7
8
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not settle every issue. One obvious sense in which the law can be
unsettled is that within a particular jurisdiction, the resolution of
some unusual or borderline situation may not be clear. The law can
also be unsettled in the sense that various jurisdictions divide over
the proper treatment of a situation. Either of these situations may
be a signal that society has no clear moral judgment about the
point; the particular application of some settled standard may be
troublesome or, more interestingly, divergent approaches to underlying moral questions may yield contrary conclusions to the problem at hand. Just as settled principles of law may be a guide to the
range of moral consensus in a society, legal problems whose resolution is unclear or sharply disputed can point to uncertainties and
disagreements about moral standards.
2. Necessary Qualifications - How Far Does The Law of Justi-

fiable Force Represent The Moral Judgments of Members of
Society?

The easy assumption that a clear legal disposition about justifiable force represents a corresponding moral judgment of members
of the community on that issue must be sharply qualified in a variety of ways, but not in a manner that undermines this endeavor.

a. Justification, Excuse, and Minimal Standards
Freedom from legal liability does not always imply moral justification. One may have a successful defense either because one has
an excuse or because the law imposes a minimal standard of behavior that does not rise to what accepted moral standards require.
The distinction between justification and excuse is roughly the
difference between saying, "What you did was really all right," and
"What you did was wrong in some sense, but we can't blame you
for it." While a legal excuse, such as insanity, may correspond to
notions of social morality about when people should be blamed,
successful invocation of an excuse obviously does not show that an
act was morally justified.9 Matters are somewhat complicated in
• If the excuse is one that suggests that the person committing the act remains dangerous, as typically the insanity defense does, its successful invocation may give rise to an
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Anglo-American law because the exact distinction between excuse
and justification is disputed,10 and because any attempt to achieve
precise conceptual delineation would establish that some instances
of justification are covered by defenses labeled excuses and some
instances of excuse are covered by defenses labeled justifications.
Duress, for example, is an excuse, but if the threatened harm is
great enough in comparison with the demanded act: 'fThrow me
that money or I'll shoot three customers," people obviously think
of compliance with the demand as proper, not merely as excused.11
On the other side, a person who stupidly (negligently) concludes
that his life is threatened, may be able to claim self-defense, a justification, as a bar to conviction for a crime based on intention or
recklessness, 12 though he is really offering ml: excuse.
The relation between legal standards and moral judgment about
acceptable behavior is characterized by furth~r, more subtle, variations. Although in many domains, the law demands very little, permitting behavior that most people would think is clearly immoral,
the containment of physical conflict is such an obvious target of
the state's concern that legal rules leave virtually no latitude for
instances of force that are thought morally unacceptable. The law
does, however, approve behavior that may be considered to be less
alternative form of disposition, civil commitment, that can protect society. Successful invocation of a justification would never, in our legal tradition, be the basis for such an alternative disposition.
10
Drawing support from continental legal systems, George Fletcher has proposed that a
principle is not one of justification, unless it would be wrong for officials to interfere with
the act that is sought to be justified. See G. FLETcHER, REnilNKING CRIMINAL LAW 759-69
(1978); Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate a Justification or an Excuse for Escape?, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1355 (1979). According to Professor Fletcher, so long as
a prison guard could rightfully try to stop an escapee, the escapee would have only a "excuse," no matter how proper his own conduct appeared in retrospect. In my view, this approach drifts too far from the core notion that one is justified if what one has done is all
right.
11
Some modem formulations of the defense of general necessity reach responses to
threats of harm by human agents. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 1975). In
those jurisdictions, a threatened defendant could rely directly on a justification defense as
well as duress, but in many traditional formulations the defense of general necessity has
been limited to dangers that arise from "natural" forces. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 381 (1972).
1
• Whether an unreasonable belief in the need to use force creates any defense at all is
a point on which jurisdictions are divided.
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than ideal, though still acceptable. For example, if other conditions for necessary self-protection are met, the law permits a person to use deadly force without retreating from his dwelling, even
though he knows he could retreat with perfect safety. Many people
would say that if a person knows he can avoid bloodshed altogether, the best course of action is to retreat, but that the person
who is unwilling to leave his home in the face of unwarranted aggression has acted within the range of morally permissible choices.
More generally, when the morally best action requires surrender of
a right that society cannot fairly demand or involves a standard
higher than most people can live up to, some actions that fall short
of that standard are considered morally pei:mitted in a manner
that is poorly conveyed by the concept of excuse. In a suitably
broad sense, one employed in this essay, these actions can be spoken of as justified. In this sense, the conclusion that -a legal rule
reflects a view of moral justification does not necessarily mean that
the act deemed to be justified is regarded as morally preferable, or
morally equal, to some possible alternative act.
b. Practicality and Structure in Legal Standards
Several features of legal standards render them less than a perfect mirror of prevailing social morality. Since they must be used
by some people to evaluate the actions of others, they must be administrable in a manner not required of moral perspectives, which
are often more flexible. Though some legal standards may reflect
compromises between competing moral principles that yield no coherent notion of moral justification, the exercise of drafting a related set of provisions or trying to accommodate a number of prior
cases generally demands from the statutory draftsman or judge a
degree of rationality and generality that many people may not
achieve in their everyday moral judgments. And, given its slowness to change, the law plainly reflects the moral judgments of the
past as much as those of the present. What the law mainly illuminates are a society's more deliberate and structured practical judgments made over time. As one moves from relatively concrete judgments to higher levels of abstraction, one's claims to support from
legal standards must necessarily be more tentative.
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The Law of Justifiable Force and Class Bias

One important question is whether the law can truly be said to
represent the judgments of the community or represents only the
judgments of the class in society that dominates the development
of legal standards. No doubt many laws, and perhaps even large
parts of some branches of law, may be attributed to intense pressure by interested minorities. Even when legal standards are not
the direct consequence of such pressure, they may evince greater
concern for the interests and perspectives of the powerful than for
the interests and perspectives of others. Possibly the law governing use of force to protect property reflects class bias; but for
the most part the concern that the law supports narrow class interest has little relevance in respect to the interpersonal use of force.
If a high percentage of aggressive personal violence emanates from
members of "lower" classes, it is also directed at members of those
classes, and the great majority of members of all classes perceive
the need to restrict violence. Thus, approaches to such violence do
not involve sharply competing class interests or perceptions. As
has already been suggested, however, the law tends toward structure and rationality; and its standards are developed by an elite
that may place a specially high priority on containing physical conflict. For these reasons, aspects of the law may turn out to be
stricter than the moral standards by which many ordinary people
judge examples of physical force.
3.

The Value of Discovering the Law's Implicit Moral
Judgments

With the qualifications noted above, the law governing justifiable
physical force does illuminate community judgments about such
force. At its most modest, the effort to discern the law's principles
has sociological value, serving as one avenue for elucidating the
shared normative premises and disagreements of a society. Beyond
this the discovery of a society's major premises can be a useful
starting point for discussions among members of the society concerning practices and judgments that appear to be in tension with
those premises. But neither of these observations deflects the possible objection that finding out what a society's present moral
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premises are tells us nothing about what a society's premises
should be, and that discovering what uses of force are presently
deemed justifiable tells us nothing about what uses of force are really justifiable.
To make some further claim about the value of this exercise requires a suggestion about connections between the moral principles
discoverable by reference to the law and correct moral principles.
The idea of "correct moral principles" can be understood in many
senses, two of which will be discussed. The first sense involves
moral truths that transcend time, place, custom and opinion. The
second sense involves the best public morality for a particular society. If one does not believe in transcendent moral truths, he may
still accept the idea that some moral principles could be considered
better for a society than others, better in serving the goals that its
members set for themselves, or in its compatibility with nonmoral
beliefs and practices, or in achievement of values that the observer
holds. 18 Under any of these perspectives "correct" moral principles
for one society might vary considerably from "correct" moral principles for another society. My own beginning point for ethical
thought is a fairly traditional Christian understanding of the nature of the universe and of humanity's place in it, and a belief in
transcendent moral principles, of which loving concern is the most
important.14 From this perspective, a public morality may still appear very important. In a society in which people have widely divergent religious beliefs and in which many people treat morality
as largely divorceable from the religious conceptions they accept, a
18
A problem of circularity exists here. What is one to imagine as taken as given for a
particular society and what is one to imagine as subject to criticism for not being consonant
with the best possible morality for that society? H everything about the society is taken as
given, speaking about any better moral principles would be senseless; if everything is taken
as subject to change, there would be no distinctive features of a particular society that
would constrain the choice of better principles. The idea, roughly, is that basic forms of
social organization, existing technology, religious beliefs, etc., are to be taken as given, and
the question then becomes what would be the best moral principles for a society with those
features. A deeper analysis would require much more thorough treatment of this problem.
" In contrast to traditional natural law theories, I doubt that difficult moral questions
are resolvable on grounds of ordinary experience, rationality, and self-evidence, believing
that one's religious premises will often be needed to help one decide what set of moral
standards one will accept for oneself and what set one will wish to incorporate in the public
morality.
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pressing need exists for principles which persons of various persuasions can embrace. The religious believer properly participates in
the ongoing effort to develop and sustain such a morality, though
he will continue to believe that his own actions are subject to evaluation by standards that reach beyond those of existing public morality, and of the best public morality for his society.15 His view of
what would be the best public morality may be influenced by his
religious beliefs, but it may also be affected by the preferences and
opinions of members of the society.
If the law- provides a relatively rational and structured view of
the content of present public morality, it may also suggest what
are the appropriate elements of a correct public morality. One
may, of course, believe that particular moral views reflected in the
law are misguided in important respects, but still suppose that existing public morality will incorporate substantial aspects of correct public morality. The more ambitious aspect of the endeavor in
this essay is to use the law as a grounding for thought about what
uses of force are really morally justificable under correct principles
of public morality.
4. Possibilities and Problems of Transposition

The question of transposition remains. The object of this essay
is to use the law governing legal force to draw conclusions about
the morality of physical force that is illegal. The theory is that the
general principles governing rights and the conditions of their protection have application beyond the boundaries in which they actually make physical force legal. At one level, the aim is to determine what approach to illegal violence members of a society must
take if their positions are to be compatible with their positions on
ordinary interpersonal force. On another level, the aim is to seek
correct principles of public morality for evaluating illegal violence.
Because views on ordinary interpersonal force may not be heavily
dependent on class and national interests, the principles derivable
from the law may serve as a relatively detached point from which
16 For example, a person might conceive that he has a religiously based duty to submit
to a wrong, even though he would consider a violent response to be justified by the best

public morality for his society.
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to consider more highly charged questions of illegal force. They allow one to understand better how far moral claims about illegal
force can fairly be derived from shared premises and how far they
must depend on debatable factual assertions, moral outlooks that
consciously supplement or diverge from the shared premises, or
narrow partisan ideology.
One must, of course, be extremely careful; one cannot simply assume that standards applicable to legal force in interpersonal relations apply without qualification to illegal force. In a later section
some of the crucial elements that differentiate illegal violence from
more ordinary uses of force will be enumerated. However, even
when one concludes that different principles of ·evaluation should
govern, the comparison with analogous cases of ordinary force
helps one to understand why the illegal force should be judged differently. When moral judgment about illegal political force is uncertain, the comparison with standards of legal justification reveals
whether the uncertainty stems from pervasive doubts about the
use of force or special questions about illegal force.
Many of these introductory remarks suffer from a regrettable degree of abstraction. The rest of the essay serves not only as a test
of the validity of the premises stated thus far, but also as a clarification of their significance.
I

II.

LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE FORCE IN INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS

Justifications for the use of physical force by private persons can
be placed in the following categories: (1) defense of one's rights
against aggressors; (2) defense of the rights of others against aggressors; (3) protection of rights against nonaggressors; (4) protection of other interests against threatened harms; (5) punishment;
(6) paternalism.
Neither in law nor morality are paternalistic justifications often
advanced for the use of substantial physical force by one private
adult against other private adults or against government officials.
Temporary physical restraint may be necessary when someone is
extremely distraught or incapacitated by drugs or alcohol, or
rushes into a situation unaware of some crucial factor. Longer
physical restraint may be necessary for persons suffering serious
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mental illness, but that is subject to state approval. For the most
part justifications of physical force on grounds that it will conduce
to the long-term benefit of the "victims" is concentrated on children; even then, justification is typically thought to be limited to
parents, and more controversially, to others, such as teachers, with
special authority over children. Paternalism is a subsidiary motif
of some political uses of force, the claim being that those who are
coerced into being more just will themselves benefit in the long
run. But given that paternalism is a small element in the uses of
force with which this essay is concerned, it will be disregarded as a
possible justification.
As far as legal justifications are concerned, punishment can also
be disposed of summarily. Adults in our society do not have legal
authority to engage in physical punishment of other adults; except
for parental-child relations, the function of inflicting physical punishment is assigned exclusively to the state. Because a claimed
right to punish does underlie some arguments in favor of illegal
violence, that justification is treated separately, though briefly, in
that part of the essay.
The other four, legally significant, justifications are treated
here; 16 the last two of these are combined in a single section because they are susceptible to similar analysis.

A. Defense of One's Rights Against Aggressors
A person can use physical force to prevent someone else from
using unlawful force against him or from physically violating his
property rights. 17 He can use deadly physical force to protect
Separate citations for the mostly familiar propositions asserted in the text about the
present state of the law are not provided. Relevant sources include: MODEL PENAL CODE §
3.01-12 comments (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958); G. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 759-875;
LAFAVE & Sco'IT, supra note 11, at 381-407. See generally Kadish, supra note 8; Note,
Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 CoLUM. L.'
REV. 914 (1975). In the discussion that follows some sections of the Model Penal Code are
cited. These, of course, are not law in any jurisdiction, but in many respects they reflect preexisting law and in others have been an important model for subsequent enactments. In any
event, their adoption by the national and distinguished American Law Institute is independently a significant indication of modem thought about these issues.
17
The statement in the text oversimplifies the factors that may be relevant to whether
16
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against the threat of deadly force, to prevent a very serious crime,
such as kidnapping, or forced sexual intercourse, or to prevent expulsion from his dwelling by someone without any claim of right to
the dwelling. 18 Ordinarily a person may not use physical force to
prevent a breach of right that does not itself involve some physical
invasion; a person is not allowed, for example, to employ physical
force to stop a slander. More importantly for this analysis, people
must suffer some physical invasions of right rather than use deadly
force, even if deadly force is the only means they have for protecting their rights. A storeowner may not shoot a fleeing teenager who
has just pinched a candy bar. Nor may a victim resort to deadly
force if he otherwise stands to suffer the infliction of force that he
knows will not cause serious bodily harm. Exactly how much the
victim should have to suffer without using deadly force is sharply
disputed; and one battleground of contention over justification defenses is when deadly force should be considered a permissible response to crimes that do not threaten serious bodily harm.
Generally, physical force is not justified unless it is necessary. If
someone can protect his rights without employing physical force he
must do so, and, if some force is needed, he must not employ force
that is excessive to accomplish his purpose. A person is not required to retreat, however, rather than use ordinary force. He may
stand his ground in the face of an aggressor. Jurisdictions are divided over whether a person must retreat (if he can do so safely)
rather than use deadly force; in no jurisdiction is a person required
to retreat from his own dwelling rather than use deadly force.
For the most part, the legal right to respond to aggression with
physical force does not depend on the level of culpability of the
aggressor. A potential victim may use the same force against a person who is insane or under duress, or who mistakes the situation,
as he may against a person who is intentionally seeking to do him
the use of force in defense of property is warranted. For an attempt to sort out a variety of
situations in a detailed statutory provision, see MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
18
This last principle is less clearly settled than the other two. Compare MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.06(d)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) with LAFAVE & ScO'IT, supra note 11, at
400-01.
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harm without any excuse.
Force that is otherwise justifiable may not be justified if it is
likely to cause undue harm to innocent bystanders. Assuming that
injury to the bystanders is not virtually certain, the test is whether
'the person using the force has acted recklessly or negligently in
regard to the bystanders.19
Although threats to use physical force often constitute crimes or
torts, especially when they are coupled with demands, a threat to
use physical force is not generally assimilated to actual use of the
force threatened. More particularly, special restrictions on the justifiable use of deadly force do not apply to threats to use deadly
force. 20 In some circumstances, the initial issuance of a threat may
affect whether actual employment of force, or deadly force, is warranted. If a person can threaten without endangering himself, his
actual use of force may not appear necessary until he has unsuccessfully tried to dissuade the aggressor by a threat. Also, an aggressor's failure to accede to a threat may heighten the reasonably
apprehended hazard to the person who has made the threat and
thus affect the degree of responsive force that is justified.21 In some
significant senses, the rules governing use of force in defense of
one's rights treat all people equally. One's position under the rules
18
If the risk of the bystanders is unjustifiably great, the consequence may be that the
use of force is considered unjustified altogether or, as the Model Penal Code provides in §
3.09(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), unjustified only in regard to possible crimes committed against the bystanders.
0
•
The Model Penal Code, § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), has an explicit provision to this effect.
•• The idea is that a person who appears to pose only a moderate danger or who merely
appears suspicious may seem much more dangerous if he remains undeflected by a threat of
force. Such a conclusion would, of course, obviously not be appropriate if the person
threatened merely tries to flee..
In the broad range of human conduct, failed threats can influence morally justifiable
conduct in at least two other ways. Someone who is involved in continuing relations with a
threatened person or who has his actions publicized to a wider audience may need to carry
out one threat-to keep future threats credible. And, on some occasions, the refusal to accede
to a threat of a person in authority may increase the magnitude of the wrong done. (Parents
may be justified in spanking a child who acts in disregard of a threat to spank, even though
spanking would be too severe a penalty for the same act done in absence of a threat.)
Neither of these considerations has relevance to legal justifications for the use of physical
force by private adults against other adults.
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depends on one's actions, not upon social or economic class. And
people's lives, and their other interests, are treated equally. One
person cannot say his life or property (of a certain value) is really
worth more than another person's life or property (of the same
value). Yet taken together, the rules do draw important distinctions among people. While they show concern for the precious interests of victims of aggressors, aggressors, and bystanders, they
give clear priority to the interests of victims and bystanders over
the interests of aggressors.
The interests of aggressors are protected pervasively by the requirement of necessity; no matter how egregious the behavior of
the aggressor may be, the victim is not warranted in inflicting force
on him that goes beyond what is needed to protect his own rights.
(The victim's reactions are, of course, judged in light of his need to
react instantaneously.) The aggressor's interests are also protected
by principles that forbid force that is greatly disproportionate to
his own invasion of right; most importantly he may be protected
against deadly force, even though such force is the only means
available for stopping his commission of a crime that does not
threaten the physical security of others.
The preference for the interests of victims over aggressors is displayed in a variety of ways. In respect to the aggressor, the victim
need not engage in nice calculation of the benefits and burdens of
using force. He may use nondeadly force to remove a trespasser,
though the harm he predictably will cause the trespasser may be
greater than the harm the trespasser would otherwise cause him.
Not only may a victim take the life of a single assailant if his own
life is threatened, he may take the life of any number of assailants
if that is necessary to preserve his own life. Further, he may try to
kill an assailant even though he might well survive if he refrained
from taking action. Let us imagine the somewhat artificial case in
which a victim realizes that if he does not respond to a single assailant, he probably will not die - the assailant is a bad shot and
his chances of hitting the victim from the distance that separates
the two is about 25 %. The law, despite its lack of precision about
the threshold probability of harm needed to trigger a justified response, does not demand that a person stand passively and accept
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a substantial chance of being killed when he can reduce or eliminate the risk by shooting at the assailant. Deadly force can also be
used to prevent crimes like rape and armed robbery that result in
the death of victims only in a small percentage of cases. The permission to use such force may indicate both that taking life may
sometimes be justified to protect interests of lesser magnitude than
life and that any serious possibility of losing one's life at the hands
of an aggressor may be enough to warrant the use of deadly force.
The rules that a victim need not retreat rather than use force
and that he need not retreat from his home or place of work (or
anywhere else in many jurisdictions) rather than use deadly force
also give preference to the interests of the victim over those of the
aggressor. The victim need not forego his liberty to remain in a
place where he has a right to be, even if the predictable consequence of his exercise of that liberty will be serious harm to the
aggressor.

In respect to innocent bystanders the situation is very different.
Though few, if any, cases involving deadly force directed at aggressors have involved certain death for innocent bystanders, such
force would not be justified unless it satisfied the requisites of a
general justification defense, 22 discussed below. In cases involving
risk to innocent bystanders, the assumption underlying judgments
about recklessness and negligence presumably is that the interests
of bystanders count as heavily as the interests of the victim.
What one can confidently say about aggressors and victims and
bystanders is that the law makes a good deal turn on whether one
is a wrongdoer. The wrongful act of the aggressor and the defense
of rights by the victim largely determine what interests the victim
can protect by force. 23 If one seeks the moral assumption underlying this approach, the most obvious candidate is the widespread
sense that if someone's interests must be sacrificed, it should be
•• See Kadish, supra note 8, at 889-90.
•• A special factor operates in many situations in which retreat is an option. The aggressor has commenced or threatened wrongful behavior, but the potential victim has a possibility of retreating safely before the moment when he must use force. The rule that he
need not retreat may reflect the view that he should not have to assume that wrongful
aggression will continue but should be able to assume that the aggressor will stop.
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those of the aggressor. This deontological intuition about rights
and duties has two aspects. One is that the threatened victim
should not have to surrender his or her most precious possessions
in the absence of wrongdoing; the second is that the transgressor
sacrifices rights he or she would otherwise have by the intentional
breach of another's rights. In the ordinary situation, the intuitions
about the rights of the victim and the assailant's surrender of
rights are hard to distinguish, but the special force of the former
appear in examples when assailants are innocent: small children, or
adults who are unbalanced, acting under duress or ignorant of the
danger they pose.24 If the victim is both innocent and passive, he
may permissibly take the life of an "assailant" even if the assailant
is innocent of wrongdoing and known to be so by the victim. By
contrast, the "victim" is under much greater constraint if he contemplates taking the life of someone whose actions are not the
source of the threat to him, that is an innocent bystander. 211
Although our sense of who has a right to "defend" himself or
herself with physical force does depend partly on who initiated the
original action that causes the threat to life, it may be a mistake to
suppose that justifiable force against a wrongdoer will always be
the same as justifiable force against an innocent assailant. One
might well conclude, for example, that as far as moral justification
is concerned, one should sometimes be required to retreat to avoid
using force against a known innocent even if one could stand one's
ground against a wrongdoer. A similar judgment might be made
about using deadly force against innocents when their actions create only a very low risk of harm to the victim. If typical statutory
formulations in Anglo-American law do not make the distinction ·
•• A fanciful example of the last category would be a person unwittingly approaching a
victim with a poison dart (planted and controlled by someone else) that is primed to strike
the victim when the carrier gets within a certain range. In a slightly more plausible version,
the "innocent assailant" carries a bomb that is set to go off; but in that instance the "assailant" is likely to lose his own life whether or not he is stopped by deadly force before reaching the victim.
•• C may be an innocent bystander because he is close to A who is an aggressor against
B, or because a "natural" problem of B's (his brakes have failed) creates a condition in
which B's saving himself may jeopardize C (C stands in the only path B can take to avoid
going over the cliff).
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between guilty and innocent aggressors, 26 the likeliest explanation
is that these situations were considered too rare to make any explicit treatment worthwhile.
The requirement that justifiable force be necessary contradicts
any notion that a wrongdoer sacrifices his rights in any absolute
sense. The necessity requirement alone may be compatible with a
view that the victim retains an absolute privilege to defend his
rights, since all that it forbids is force not needed to defend
rights. 27 But the principle of proportionality, particularly as evidenced by the rule that deadly force cannot be used at all against
certain invasions of right, is obviously at odds both with any absolute privilege to defend rights and with any absolute sacrifice of
rights by those who violate rights. 28
One way of understanding the principles of proportionality and
necessity is that they impose consequentialist constraints on actions that might be justified if one analyzed matters purely in
terms of rights and duties: a person can defend his rights against
those who engage in breaches of duty, but only if the balance of
consequences is not too unfavorable. Under this view, the existing
law governing defense of rights appears to reflect a mixed deontological-consequentialist approach to the ethics of violence.
The present law could, however, be defended on more exclusively consequentialist or deontological bases. 29 A utilitarian would
•• According to George Fletcher, "German law rejects the duty to retreat in all cases,
except attacks by children and the deranged." G. FLETCHER, supra note 10, at 865. If defense against innocent aggressors were viewed in Anglo-American law as really being a question of necessity rather than self-defense, see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW 436 n.85 (2d ed. 1960), the privilege not to retreat would presumably be sharply
restricted.
27
That requirement does, of course, constrain the victim's ability to choose what force
he will use to defend his rights.
•• German law apparently gives greater scope to the autonomy of the victim to defend
his rights. See G. Fletcher, supra note 10, at 871-72.
29
A possible intermediate position that takes as central the likely number of rights
violations is passed over here. Such an approach shifts the ultimate focus from whether one
is violating rights on a particular occasion to whether one's actions will decrease or increase
rights violations - in that respect the approach in consequentialist. But in focusing on
rights violations rather than welfare or happiness as the test of acceptable consequences, the
approach has a powerful deontological component.
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ground the preference for the interests of victims largely in the desirability of deterring violations of legal right; the proscription
against weighing the comparative value of lives could be taken as a
starting premise for a version of utilitarianism or as a necessary
administrative safeguard against misjudgment or abuse. Thus the
utilitarian might be able to defend most or all of the law of selfdefense without talking about moral rights. A rights theorist could
provide an exclusively deontological account by describing the aggressor's sacrifice pf rights as proportional to the harm he proposes
to do and by granting the victim a right of defense no broader than
what is needed to protect his underlying rights. Indeed David
Richards provides just such an account in his paper for this symposium. so Though this sort of account may reflect the manner in
which ordinary consequences can impinge on the precise definition
of rights and duties, 31 it does suggest that the major features of the
present law can be defended without direct reference to consequentialist calculation. Strict deontological and strict consequentialist approaches may have a kind of theoretical purity that is
lacking in a mixed account; but it would be mistaken to dismiss
the latter as incoherent. 32 Perhaps the best public morality simply
does not reduce to a strict utilitarian or deontological approach.
And, whatever may be true about the best public morality, most
people may now hold views that are not capable of such reduction.
Rules that are most easily explained in terms of a mixed account
may accurately reflect the complex moral views of most people.
so See Richards, Rights, Resistance, and the Demands of Self-Respect, 32 EMORY L.J.
405, 424-27 (1983).
31

One has no "right" to shoot someone to save a candy bar because almost everyone
regards the consequences of being shot as much worse than the consequences of losing a
candy bar.
32
I am not sure precisely what David Richards means when he talks of "irreconcilable
elements." Richards, supra note 30, at 425. Certainly deontological and utilitarian elements
are different and not collapsible into one another. But that does not rule out the possibility
that they may coexist in a correct moral position. When Richards says that the essentially
mixed account of Anglo-American law that Kadish and Fletcher provide "appears to rest on
defective moral analysis," id., I tske him to be asserting that that moral position is unsound,
not to be making a judgment about the position most people presently hold.

1983]

JUSTIFICATION AND MORAL APPRAISAL

457

B. Defense of the Rights of Others Against Aggressors

Persons who are tied to the victim by a close relationship, such
as family membership, have long had the same right to protect the
victim as the victim has himself. But the law in many jurisdictions
either did not give strangers the right to intervene at all to defend
another, allowed intervention only in instances of serious attack, or
held the intervenor strictly liable for any mistakes he might make
in appraisal of the situation. 33 Though the practical effect of these
limitations was much lessened by justifications to use force in
crime prevention, still in some cases the position of the well-meaning intervenor was sharply distinct from that of the victim and his
close relations. The movement now is strongly in the direction of
assimilating the rights of all intervenors to the rights of the victims
themselves, the idea being that if it is proper for a victim to use
force against the aggressor, it is proper for an intervenor, who has
the same understanding about the facts as the victim,34 to use
force to protect the victim from the aggressor.
At first glance, it may appear that the modern trend enjoys support from both consequentialist and rights-based perspectives. If
it is desirable for people to defend themselves, so should help from
others be desirable. If a person has a right to defend himself,
others should be able to help him do so. Further, if a breach of law
by an aggressor is seen in some symbolic way as an attack on the
legal order, and thus on all those involved in the legal order, the
right of outsiders to resist would also follow. 315 These initial
thoughts may leave us with some puzzlement why a more robust
right of intervention has not been traditionally recognized and why
even now that right is not universally accepted.
One reason concerns inaccurate perceptions of facts. Insofar as
traditional restrictions have received modern defense, the argument has been that since intervenors are less likely than apparent
•• An example of a case talcing this last position is People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183
N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962).
•• In most recent formulations, each person is controlled by his own actual, or actual
and reasonable, perception of the facts. Thus, the intervenor may have a privilege that differs from that of the .victim if the two have different factual perceptions.
•• See G. Fr.ETCHER, supra note 10, at 869.
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victims to understand the facts, they should not be encouraged.
Whatever the intrinsic persuasiveness of this position, the question
it raises is essentially one about prudent action upon uncertain
facts. Though important issues about illegal violence do concern
uncertainties in normative evaluation and factual judgment, this
particular sort of uncertainty, inability to tell who is an aggressor
in a literal sense, has little relevance in that context. Thus, this
problem is put aside, and the assumption is made that intervenors,
victims, and aggressors all have perfect knowledge of the facts.
One can think of some other reasons why the rights of intervenors might be distinguished from the rights of victims with respect
to certain situations. One might be that the vindication of rights is
simply not possible at all, or is much less effective, if the guarantor
is a third party. If constant humiliation by A has deprived B of
self-respect, B may have to make claims on his own to restore his
seJf-respect. 36 This sort of reason has little application to protection of rights for which personal use of physical force is warranted;
those rights to physical integrity and property can be about as well
protected by the intervention of others.
A reason of more general application for distinguishing victims
and intervenors might be that the moral right of the original victim includes decision whether and how to respond to aggression
and that intervention contrary to the victim's wishes should not be
authorized. Some distinctions must be made to clarify this troublesome issue. If the aggressor's behavior is undoubtedly criminal,
and something the police could stop, whatever the victim wishes, a
strong argument exists for allowing intervenors to stop the action
as well. If the victim's consent can render behavior noncriminal,
and the intervenor knows that consent has been given or is about
to be given,37 then he should not be able to intervene. The tricky
situations are ones in which the victim's right to use particular
force depends on his present vulnerability to harm, and he declines
See Richards, supra note 30, at 420-21.
Suppose A commits a trespass on B's land, and B tells C he plans to give his consent.
Prior to actually giving the consent, B could use force against A, but if C knows that B is
going to give consent he should be foreclosed from using force even before B actually gives
the consent.
38

37
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to exercise a privilege or chooses to take a risk, e.g. he decides to
retreat or not to return the fire of a very poor shot. Suppose that
at time t, B could shoot at A who is running toward him with a
knife, or retreat. If C knows that B plans to retreat and also knows
that B can do so safely, C should not be able to shoot A at time t,
even though B could do so.38 Resolution is more difficult if B
chooses not to return the fire of A, whose chances of hitting B are
slight. One can argue that B should be able to choose whether to
take the risk, or that since A is trying to kill B and might succeed,
others can properly try to prevent A's attempt at murder even if
killing A is the only way to do so.39 The victim's authority to control intervention should reach at least the retreat situation and circumstances in which his consent can remove the sting of wrongdoing; how much further that authority should extend is debatable.
Obviously this ground for restricting intervention does not apply
when the victim desires assistance from the intervenor.
When the victim's right is threatened and could justifiably be
protected by his own use of force, and an intervenor's force is welcomed by the victim and can protect the right, the only reason for
restricting the intervenor more than the victim would be a balance
of likely consequences that is unfavorable in some respect. The
risk of success by .the aggressor may seem preferable to what it
would take to assure protection of the victim because the risk is
low, because many aggressors are involved, or because of complicating moral factors concerning the lives of aggressors and victims.
An intervenor who could stop an aggressor only by gravely wounding him or · killing him may know that the aggressor has little
chance of hitting the victim with his gun; or he may realize that he
will have to kill many aggressors to save the victim's life; or he may
think that the aggressor (a member of an outraged lynch mob) is
actually less guilty in a ·significant sense than the victim (a convicted multiple murderer)."0 In each of these situations, the victim
38
This problem does not arise at all if B retreats prior to the moment when he himself
could use deadly force. In that event, if retreat is successful, the time would never arise
when the intervenor might be able to use deadly force.
39
The hypothetical dilemma can be sharpened if one assumes that A is not a threat to
anyone else and is known to be planning to turn himself in after the attack.
◄• This last example directly raises deontological questions about the comparative
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himself would have the right to use deadly force in his own defense. If the victim's own right to use deadly force is simply the
product of a conclusion that the outcome that will be achieved is
morally desirable, or at least acceptable, then the intervenor's right
to use such force would follow. Such an outcome would not necessarily mean that similar force by victims and intervenors would always produce the same legal consequences. Because of the threat
to his own vital interests the victim might be excused for protecting those interests in a manner that would not generate an excuse
for the disinterested intervenor. Thus, a victim might be excused
for using deadly force when an intervenor would be punishable for
using the same force. I have suggested earlier, however, that when
victims (allowably) prefer their own lesser interests to the greater
interests of the aggressor, one does not conceive of them as requiring an excuse. Moreover, their actions are considered to be morally
justified, even if an alternative course (e.g., retreat) would have
been morally preferable. For this broad sense of justification
(based on reasonable expectations of what people are capable of
and on notions of privileges to defend rights), it may matter
whether the person who acts is the victim or someone who does not
suffer a threat to his own rights and who can reasonably be expected to refrain from using force, or deadly force. In order to be
morally justified, outsiders may have to pay more attention to the
balance of likely consequences than those whose rights are being
directly infringed.
Though the doubts and complexities explored in this section are
hardly to be gleaned from a quick survey of the law governing
third person intervention, they may nonetheless have some bearing
on why assimilation of rights of intervenors to victims has taken as
long as it has. That serious doubts can be raised about assimilation
in special cases does not necessarily mean that any of the traditional alternatives are preferable or even that exceptions are warranted in statutory formulations on justification. Putting aside the
unpersuasive argument based on intervenor ignorance, the suggested bases for distinguishing victim and intervenor rights cover
deserts of aggressor and victim. Considerations of desert would also be treated as relevant in
an adequately sophisticated utilitarian theory, however.
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only a small percentage of possible instances of intervention; one
might well opt for a straightforward principle of assimilation
rather than trying to draft language to exclude these rare instances. -n The existence of such a principle in many jurisdictions
almost certainly does not reflect any generally held opinion that in
every instance an intervenor's moral justification for using force
will exactly track that of the victim.

C. Indirect Protection of Rights and the Protection and Promotion of Other Interests
On some occasions people trying to deflect a threat use physical
force against persons who are not themselves the source of the
threat. The threat may originate in the actions of another human
being - A uses B as a shield in his attack on C, or A threatens to
kill D unless C robs B. Or the threat may originate in natural
causes - C whose brakes have failed can avoid going over a cliff
with his two passengers only if he runs down pedestrian B. In each
instance C can prevent a harm by directing physical force at B.42
When the danger arises because of natural causes, no breach of
duty has occurred, and strictly there is no danger of violation of
C's rights. On the other hand, when A threatens to harm C, C can
protect his right against A by harming B. More troublesome questions of characterization may be involved if the threat is caused by
human negligence, direct or distant, or by the intentional actions
of a person lacking mental responsibility, but these questions need
here be resolved only if it matters what the source of danger is.43
n The existence of the sorts of complexities examined in this section does constitute
one good reason against attempting to draft language that tries to cover all the contingencies in which intervenors may act. One alternative is leaving the whole realm of justification
to common law development; another is adoption of some general standard that permits
judicial flexibility.
•• The shield example differs from the ordinary situation in which harm to bystanders
is risked in that harm to the innocent shield is virtually certain if a frontal attack is made
on the aggressor.
0
I conclude below that the source of danger is not crucial; the reasons that one can
present for making it crucial would suggest treating these cases like ones involving "natural"
causes. On the definitional question, see infra note 75 and accompanying text, I suggest
that a person can be deprived of a moral right by human action that does not intentionally
cause such a deprivation.
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Anglo-American law has two defenses that reach actions directed
at innocent third persons. The first, duress, deals exclusively with
human threats. A person who acts in response to a threat is relieved of criminal liability if his will is "overborne" or he is "coerced," and if a person of reasonable firmness would not have been
able to resist. The de(ense is considered an excuse, and it reaches
instances in which an actor is excused for understandably making
a wrong choice. For this reason successful invocation of the defense
obviously does not establish that the act was justified. Yet the defense does cover many instances of justified action. 44 If A credibly
threatens to kill C's wife unless C socks B in the jaw, C's assault of
B would not only be excusable but the best choice in the circumstances. Even if C remained calm and rational throughout, one
could say that he was "coerced" by the compelling reason to commit the assault. 411
Virtually all jurisdictions46 have a second defense, general justification or necessity. As the label implies, successful invocation of
this defense does establish justification, the idea being that a cool
rational actor could properly choose the conduct involved. Traditionally the general justification defense has been conceived as involving natural dangers; but in most modern American statutory
formulations it also covers dangers arising from human threats,
and thus overlaps substantially with the defense of duress. In
many jurisdictions the defense has not been formulated in a statute; since actual cases involving the defense are rare,47 the law in
those jurisdictions is likely to be uncertain on many important
0

In fact, LaFave and Scott treat the defense as essentially one of justification. LAFAVE

& ScO'IT, supra note 11, at 374-75.
40 One's ·will can be coerced or overborne either by techniques that gravely impair rational judgment or by the illegitimate introduction of powerful reasons that leave only one
rational choice. Often the same tactics, e.g. threats of death, can have both effects.
46
One English study does cast doubt on whether this defense is actually part of the
common law of England, THE LAW COMMISSION, Codification of the Criminal Law: General
Principles: Defenses of General Application, Working Paper No. 55, in THE LAW COMMISSION WORKING PAPERS Nos. 1-64 20-21 (1974 & photo. reprint 1977). The only plausible
argument for eschewing the defense altogether is that prosecutorial discretion or interpretation of specific crimes will take care of the appealing cases.
41
Prosecutors do not proceed in most instances when a powerful case of justification
appears, as when husbands break speeding laws driving wives in labor to hospitals.
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points. Among statutes, sharp divergences exist, most notably over
whether the defense should ever be available against charges of intentional homicide (many jurisdictions providing neither a justification nor a duress defense in such cases), over whether the harm
to be avoided must constitute a grave harm or can include lesser
evils, and over how the harm to be avoided and the harm caused
are to be compared. On the last point, one influential modern standard, that of the Model Penal Code, requires that the harm sought
to be avoided "be greater" than that sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense."8 The New York standard, also widely fol-lowed, demands that the need to avoid the harm "clearly outweigh" the desirability of avoiding the injury the statute seeks to
prevent."9
Though the interaction between duress and general justification,
and the uncertain boundaries of both defenses in many jurisdictions make confident assertion difficult, modern law apparently
does not make justification turn on a right's being threatened by a
breach of duty. 150 So long as the actor is directing force at an innocent person, his claim of justification does not depend on whether
the threat to his own vital interests arises from the willful act of
another or a natural danger. 111 Since the danger (say, loss of life) to
the actor and the innocence of the person who is the object of the
actor's force are the same in both instances, this commonality of
treatment is consistent with both a consequentialist approach and
one that emphasizes the rights of innocents to be free of intentional force. Two arguments, looking in opposite directions, can be
presented for making a threat to rights matter. Someone who believes that the test of the moral justifiability of an act is whether it
minimizes instances of violations of rights152 might conclude that C
should kill one innocent person to prevent two murders but should
•

0

MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

•• N.Y. PENAL LAW§ 35.05 (McKinney 1975).
00
In those jurisdictions that leave all responses to human threats to the defense of
duress, this statement will seem correct only if the suggestion is accepted that the duress
defense covers instances of justification as well as excuse.
1
•
An apparent anomaly does exist as far as excuse is concerned. A person who makes a
wrong but understandable response to a human threat may be excused on grounds of duress, but one who makes a similar response in the face of a natural danger has no excuse.
•• This sort of position is sketched in supra note 29.
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not kill one innocent person to prevent two deaths from natural
causes. On the other hand, one might believe that allowance of forcible responses to human threats would somehow increase the incidence of such threats, a concern not present for natural threats,
and that responses to natural threats should, therefore, be more
generously treated. The most direct relevance of this argument,
based on general deterrence, concerns an appropriate legal standard, though it might also affect one's moral evaluation as well. In
any event, since the factual predicate of this second argument is
extremely dubious, and the moral underpinnings of the first argument are unpersuasive, and since the law of justification does not
make the source of dangers critical, the assumption is made, unless
otherwise indicated, that natural and human threats need not be
distinguished when an actor relieves the threats by using force
against innocent persons who are not the source of the danger.
Uniform agreement apparently exists that if the threat to the
actor's interests is grave, such as loss of life or severe physical
harm, and the harm to the innocent person is less than grave, e.g.,
taking of property or simple assault, the infliction of harm is justified. The law, thus, represents clear rejection of any notion that no
intrusion on the rights of innocent persons is ever warranted. If the
interest safeguarded counts for much more than the interest protected by the innocent's right, then invasion of the right, including
intentional use of moderate physical force, is warranted. The moral
position this view reflects could be theorized in different ways.
Most obviously, one could say that considerations of rights are outweighed by harmful enough negative consequences, thus acknowledging an important role for consequential analysis. But one might
try to defend the present approach from an exclusively deontological perspective. When the rights of the actor (or those he protects)
are threatened, one could say that a conflict of rights is involved,
and that a very important right of the actor can take precedence
over a lesser right of the innocent object of his force. 113
&s This way of putting matters is somewhat awkward if natural causes create the danger, but one might formulate the actor's "right" in a positive way (a right to life) or sny that
the actor's vital interests can take priority over the lesser interests protected by the right of
the innocent person.
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The points at which legal rules diverge reflect some of the troubling points of moral disagreement within the society. The Model
Code and jurisdictions that follow it authorizeis• the actor to use a
straightforward consequentialist approach. So long as he chooses
the lesser harm, he may proceed to intrude on the rights of the
innocent, even if the harms avoided and inflicted are fairly closely
balanced and even if his act involves the taking of innocent life.
Though a highly complex utilitarian account might be able to explain restrictions on such an open weighing of values/is the restrictions that do exist in many jurisdictions can best be understood as
imposing deontological constraints. The position that the general
justification defense is unavailable for intentional homicides corresponds with the moral belief that intentionally taking the life of an
innocent person is always wrong, however many lives may be lost
as a consequence of one's failure to act. On this view, townspeople
may not kill their mayor in hiding even though the enemy is prepared to execute 200 hostages if that is not done. The moral perspective that underlies this view is that even when one has the capability to forestall the evil acts of otq.ers, one is not responsible
for them in the same manner as one is responsible for his own
deeds. The position that the defense cannot be invoked unless a
grave interest is threatened roughly reflects another deontological
position, iss that the rights of innocents may be invaded only when a
substantial disproportion exists between the interest sacrificed and
the interest protected. The New York requirement that the harm
avoided must "clearly outweigh" the harm caused or risked does
not quite assign independent weight to the rights of the innocent,
and can be explained as an attempt to restrain action based on
• private measures of justification; nevertheless it might be regarded
as indicating some disquiet with the simple utilitarian calculus and
as demanding that the interest protected have significantly greater
weight than the interest sacrificed.
54
This verb is carefully chosen. In all, or virtually all, circumstances an actor need not
follow the consequentialist approach. If he declines to act to avert the threat he has done no
(legal) wrong.
•• That explanation would have to rely on arguments about misjudgment, bad example,
uncertainties of fact finding, etc.
"" A person adopting a deontological perspective might accept either or both of the two
positions.
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As with rules regarding defense of rights against aggressors and
assistance by intervenors, the defenses of duress and justification
suggest a moral consensus concerning most matters that they resolve clearly. The percentage of situations about which uncertainty
or disagreement prevails is substantially greater here, a product
both of the small number of relevant legal cases and of common
perplexity about the moral justifiability of intentional intrusion on
the rights of the innocent.
·
III.

JUSTIFICATION AND FORCE IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW

Often the use of physical force against persons or property violates the law. Can such force ever be justified? To describe the
force as a violation of law is to say that it is not justified within
that legal order. 117 Force that is illegal under one legal order may be
legal under a parallel118 or superior legal order, such as international law,11° but the typical question about justified illegality is a
moral one, and that is the question on which I concentrate.
One sort of illegal force is force that comes close to being legal
force. Rules governing justified legal force are most obviously related to possible justifications of illegal force when the illegal force
falls within the basic rationale of the rule permitting legal force, or
would actually be covered by the rules in most jurisdictions.
Though the action is not justified under the directly relevant legal
rule, the actor could claim that the law in a general way supports
its moral justifiability. This is not to say that a person necessarily
has a moral right to break the law on every occasion on which the
law misguidedly has failed to confer a privilege on what would otherwise be morally justifiable action. The moral claim in favor of
obeying the law may outweigh the moral claim to engage in the
action; so that what would be a morally permissible action absent a
legal prohibition might be rendered morally impermissible by the
law's restraint. On the other hand, if the moral claim in favor of
07

The general justification defense does permit a claim that action that would other-

wise be illegal is not illegal.
118

By a parallel legal order, what is meant is another state or country that is concerned
with the action.
69
Other superior legal orders are federal law and the law of regional communities.
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the action is great enough, the action may be morally justified
though carried on in violation of the law. With these brief comments, I shall pass over uses of force that come close to being legal
and consider lawbreaking that departs more radically from the
boundaries of justification that the law provides.
My discussion is focused on forcible responses to wrongs that are
done by the government or are allowed by failures of the government to protect important rights and interests. In many instances
the force is directed at government agents. In others it may be directed against private individuals but on behalf of fundamental
moral rights that the government has refused to recognize or failed
to enforce. Finally, in some instances, individuals may actually employ force to carry out some public function that the government,
by design or ineptness, has abdicated. My thesis is that the moral
assumptions and divergencies that one can draw from the law help
to illuminate moral evaluation both of the kinds of rights and interests that give rise to justifiable illegal force, and of the kinds of
forcible actions that are proper.
The transposition from legal, personal use of force to illegal use
of force is not easy, and the reader's suspicions will be rightly
aroused. In the first place are the already-suggested difficulties in
moving from legal justification to moral justification. Most relevant in respect to physical force are the need for relatively clear
legal guidelines and the prominent aim of deterring the initial illegal acts of aggression. Moral standards can be much more flexible,
and, though considerations of general deterrence may influence
moral evaluation of acts, they are less directly significant than for
legal evaluation.
But there are further difficulties that specially concern illegal
force of the sort I discuss. A complete theory of justified illegal
violence would have to deal with subjects that ordinary legal justifications for uses of force do not seriously raise. The first subject
such a complete theory would have to address is the relationship of
a citizen to the state, more precisely the general reasons of a moral
or political sort that support his obedience to the law. When one
thinks illegal behavior is justified can depend a good deal on how
one regards various arguments, such as social contract, fair play,
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and utility, for obedience to law. The law governing private uses of
force is no direct help on this subject and this essay shall not here
attempt to fill the gap, beyond indicating in the subsequent discussion a few obvious connections between moral claims to use illegal
force and the substance and coverage of particular theories of
obligation.
A second feature of a complete account, at least an account that
gave consequences some importance, would be a theory of violence. 60 By a theory of violence, I mean a descriptive account of the
longer term consequences of the uses of physical force. At the level
of interpersonal physical force dealt with by the law, these matters
are less pressing. No doubt, one's perspective on the "naturalness"
of aggressive behavior might affect whether one thought minor
physical force, such as fist fights, should be punishable; and it
might also affect the precise lines one would draw in respect to
more serious matters. But everyone agrees that the law must contain hostile aggressive impulses, and control of serious and unrestrained physical force is everywhere accounted to be the first,
most fundamental, task of a legal order. When the issue is physical
force directed against the legal order, divergencies in views about
violence take on more practical significance. Does the use of violence by the oppressed against their oppressors liberate the spirit
of the oppressed, promote unity, and provide the basis for constructing a just and peaceful order, or does violence engender destructive attitudes of violence that survive success against the oppressors? Does violence shock the uncommitted into greater
awareness of social injustice or does it breed resentment and
heightened repression? Unless a person held the broader consequences of violence to be irrelevant to its justification, he could not
arrive at a settled position on justmed force without addressing
these and many other questions about the effects of violence on
individuals, about its efficacy in achieving short and long term
goals, and about the efficacy of alternative methods. In respect to
these questions, he could not necessarily assume uniform answers
for different societies and stages of history.
60
The point is put this way because conceivably a theory based solely on defense of
rights could disregard these considerations.
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If one concluded that on some occasions violence could be efficacious in correcting injustice or improving social conditions, and
that other more moderate techniques would not be efficacious, one
would address a third subject, the ranking in some systematic way
of the evils of violence against the evils that would remain unabated if violence were not used. 61 This essay contains neither a
thorough evaluation of the effects of the use of physical force, nor
a comparison of its harms against those of other sorts of social
wrongs. Given those gaps and the absence of an account of why
people should obey the law, the suggestions that follow plainly fall
short of definitive conclusions about when illegal force is morally
justified.

A. Defense of One's Own Moral Rights
An individual may use physical force in defense of moral rights
whose violation the law permits. The force may be directed against
agents of the government or it may be directed against private persons who can claim reliance on the law. Whether physical force is
justified at all, and how much physical force is justified, may depend on the importance of the moral right, the place in the community of the person whose right is denied, the possibility of alternative methods of securing the right, and the relation to the wrong
of the person against whom the force is used. One of the critical
differences between many uses of illegal force and most uses of legal force concerns the difficulty of deciding who counts as a wrongdoer. This is a perplexity that troubles many attempted justifications of illegal force.
1. Direct Assertion of One's Moral Right Against Persons Re-

lying on Unjust Laws - The Problem of Escaping Slaves
A system of slavery provides an extreme example of the violation
of moral rights. Analysis of the rights of slaves to use physical
81 One interesting effort of this sort is Ted Honderich's attempt to compare inequality
and violence. T. HONDERICH, On Inequality and Violence, and Differences We Make Between Them, in POLITICAL VIOLENCE 1-44 (1976). His essay includes a suggestion that the
greater shock and disturbance most people feel about violence may not be consonant with
an objective moral appraisal of the phenomena.
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force may seem unproductive, since slavery is no longer legal any
place, and those who assert claims to use physical force will usmµly
have a status that is not nearly so bad from a moral point of view.
Yet, there is value in use of the extreme example. First, it shows
clearly that if the violation of moral rights is extreme enough, a
moral right to use physical force, and even on occasion deadly
physical force, should be acknowledged. Second, it sharply illustrates many of the difficulties of deciding when extreme force is
warranted, even when the extreme violation of moral right is present. If one could resolve what would be a justifiable use of force
by slaves to escape, one would be in a position to assess the claims
of those who suffer injustices ·that are less transparent and less
gross. Finally, though slavery no longer is allowed legally, some
modern governments have undertaken genocide, and past experience gives little reason to hope we have seen the end of that practice. Perhaps no government would now give formal legal authorization to genocide; nonetheless a person marked out for extinction
by his government simply because of his race, religion, or ethnic
origin does face a denial of moral right at least as extreme as that
of the slave.

In setting up the problem of an escaping slave, a combination of
some features of modern life with those of past historical eras is
made for the purpose of deflecting some possible objections. The
crucial assumptions are that the people taken to be slaves come
from societies like our own, that slavery is imposed on persons who
are captured for that purpose and upon their children, that the
society in which the institution of slavery exists gives it legal authorization, that its law forbids masters and others to kill slaves
but otherwise treats slaves like chattel property, that many masters exhibit a relatively humane concern for the welfare of their
slaves, and that no international legal norm forbids slavery.62 If
•• The possible objections these assumptions are meant to avoid are: (1) slavery can be
the product of a voluntary choice, or the wartime capture of soldiers who accept that slavery
is one appropriate alternative to death in those circumstances; (2) slaves, at some points in
history, may have been better treated and enjoyed a higher level of welfare than wage laborers; (3) some slaves were taken from societies in which slavery was accepted, and some were
even sold for that purpose by the rulers of those societies; (4) some slaves, given their own
backgrounds, may not have conceived of a moral right to be free; (5) slavery cannot be an
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this combination of factors seems too implausible, one might imagine that a spaceship has come down to earth and taken humans to
be slaves on another planet whose beings are otherwise similar to
humans but accept slavery. A virtue of setting up the situation in
this way is that it allows us to think most clearly about what a
slave, who in other respects is like us and those we know, may do.
If one imagines a potential slave, Sheila, living peaceably in a
modern society, whose capture is attempted by foreign slave catchers, one should have little trouble concluding that she may justifiably use force, and may even kill the slave catchers, if that is the
only way for her to avoid being enslaved. Of course, at this stage
she· would have a legal right to use whatever force was necessary
since the legal right of self-defense includes a right to use deadly
force to prevent being kidnapped. But the legal right here reflects
what most people would concede is an antecedent moral right, and
the moral justification would not be thought to depend on the legal
privilege. As with the person engaging in ordinary self-defense,
Sheila, in trying to protect her precious right to freedom -against
those who seek to deprive her of it, cannot be held to too nice a
calculation of all the harms and benefits of her use of force.

In respect to moral evaluation, one significant feature might be
thought to distinguish the foreign slave catchers from ordinary
kidnappers. In their own culture, slavery is not regarded as morally
wrong, and they may not regard it as morally wrong. Should they,
for this reason, be considered only as innocent aggressors? The argument might be that their social conditioning to accept slavery
gives them a moral excuse for their behavior similar to that of a
mentally ill person. I return to this sort of problem below, but here
it is perhaps enough to say that the slave catchers have consciously
chosen to violate powerful moral and legal norms of the society
they have entered, and they have done so not in the interest of
some higher duty, but for profit. Members of that society, and exexample of the legal denial of moral rights because slavery is now universally illegal. Enumeration of these objections is by no means meant to show that each would necessarily be
relevant. For purposes of this essay, there is no need to assess the factual premi~es on which
each is based or to examine whether the truth of a particular factual premise would significantly alter the force a slave might justifiably use.

472

EM.ORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

ternal observers who believe that the moral perspectives of the
slave catchers are benighted,6 s can properly label them wrongdoers.
(In any event, even were the slave catchers generously considered
something less than wrongdoers, that would not affect Sheila's
moral right to preserve her freedom, even to the extent of using
deadly force.) 64
Sheila's moral right to use whatever force is necessary against
her captors in order to attain freedom would survive her initial
capture, and her transportation to a ship where the law of her society no longer applies. Her captors have acted immorally and the
moral significance of their breach of Sheila's rights within her own
society is not dissipated by their removal outside her borders. 611
When Sheila finds herself in a society in which slavery is approved by law, and her status as a slave bears the stamp of legality, much less clarity exists about who counts as a wrongdoer.
Roughly four classes of people may be distinguished: (1) those
whose business is to maintain the system of slavery (slave dealers,
private slave catchers, etc.); (2) those whose lives involve implementation of the laws regarding slavery, but who have not selected
a status uniquely involved with slavery (ordinary slave owners, ordinary law enforcement officials, judges, etc.); (3) those who bear
political responsibility for maintenance of the slave system (legislators, important executive officials, etc.); (4) ordinary citizens whose
lives are touched by slavery only indirectly or who are not yet old
enough to have legal or political responsibilities. Who are the
•• On this point, judgment might be somewhat different if the slave catchers simply did
not understand what human beings, or this class of human beings, were like, genuinely believing them to have only the sorts of capacities we associate with work animals.
"' The problem of innocent wrongdoing is discussed in some detail below. At this point,
one might think Sheila's options, from a moral point of view, would be slightly more constrained if she were aware of the moral ignorance of the slavecatchers. While she could
justifiably defend herself with deadly force if that were reasonably likely and necessary to
protect her freedom, conceivably issues about retreat and the futile use of force would be
judged differently.
•G Sheila's relation to ordinary ship personnel may be somewhat more doubtful, particularly if the ship has not been involved in the slavecatching endeavor but bas taken on the
slaves as ordinary cargo. Whatever doubts may exist are of the same nature as those that
apply to Sheila's relations to people within the slave-owning society, and they are not explored separately.
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wrongdoers? One might say that all above a certain age, except for
the tiny minority actively devoted to eliminating slavery, are
wrongdoers; after all, they continue to live in a society in which
this terrible evil is going on. At the other extreme, one might say
that no one is a wrongdoer. All live in a society in which slavery
has come to be accepted; they cannot really be blamed for playing
their parts in the perpetuation of that institution. This position
reflects the important truth that one's personal degree of moral
guilt depends heavily on one's awareness that what one is doing is
wrong; if a social practice has longstanding acceptance, one receives a kind of reassurance that, from society's point of view, it is
not objectionable. One lacks the clear guide to what is wrong that
is provided by a definite legal rule against a practice. Even if one
concludes, as a sensitive person might, that an institution like slavery is morally wrong, he may feel that little is to be gained by his
abstaining at a personal level from a practice that is widespread.66
In sum, a vast moral difference does exist between holding some
slaves as an owner in the midst of a slave-owning society and
secretly maintaining slaves in a society that forbids slavery, or proposing to introduce slavery into a society that now regards slavery
as wrong.
Sheila's moral right to use physical force against her master may
be less clear than her right to use physical force to resist her initial
capture, precisely because the master's status as a wrongdoer is
less clear. An asymmetry is present that does not exist in ordinary
self-defense cases; a clear moral right is being violated but no par- ·
ticular person is now clearly to blame for the violation.
The law of defense of rights suggests three different statuses:
wrongful aggressors, innocent aggressors, and innocent bystanders.
Can that law provide guidance in deciding the status of Sheila's
master and other members of the slave-owning society? The
master is certainly not an innocent bystander. Albeit with the help
of the law, he is continuously infringing Sheila's moral rights. The
most favorable claim on his behalf would seem to be that he is an
•• One thinks, for example, of the considerable number of well-to-do people who advocate a radical redistribution of wealth but who defend their own disinclination to disgorge
their own assets.
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innocent aggressor. Once this concession is made, need one worry
about whether he is a wrongdoer? After all, the law of defense of
right does not make the victim's justifiable response turn on the
wrongfulness of the aggression.
One must now engage in further inquiry to discover why the law
gauging a victim's response is comparatively indifferent to the
wrongfulness of the aggression. The overwhelming majority of aggressions that justify responsive physical force are wrongful, and
many cases of innocent aggression will reasonably appear wrongful
to the victim, who must, of course, act quickly without much
thought about the character of his assailant. 67 The cases of wrongful aggression color thinking about the problem of aggression. Furthermore, one may believe that within a society, people have a basic right to assume that others will observe their legally protected
rights and to respond as necessary when a breach occurs. Perhaps,
as has been suggested, the known innocence of an aggressor might
make a difference to a victim's proper response if the issue is
whether to retreat or whether to react to a very small risk of harm,
but one can well understand why legal standards are not drafted to
require assessment of the victim's knowledge of an aggressor's innocence in these exceptionally rare cases.
For all these reasons, one cannot take the law's summary treatment of innocent aggressors as reflecting a view that for all purposes victims are morally justified in treating them like wrongful
aggressors. In the slave-owning society, slave-owning behavior is
common, not an extraordinary intrusion on legally protected
rights, and most slave owners may not appreciate the moral wrong
that they do. Escape is a change in the ordinary pattern of events;
a decision to escape will usually be made after some deliberation
and not as an instantaneous response to a momentary threat.
These differences help support an argument that Sheila must,
morally, pay greater attention to the interests of the slave owner
than a victim of physical assault is legally required to pay to the
interest ofan innocent aggressor. It remains to canvass the alterna7
•
The victim will often not know if the aggressor is mentally ill, ~der duress, or factually mistaken.
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tives with a little more precision and to identify the possible bases
for choice.
Under certain deontological perspectives, reflected roughly in
the law of general justification in some jurisdictions, one may never
intentionally infringe certain rights (such as life) of innocent persons, and one may infringe other rights only if the interest served
by the infringement far outweighs that protected by the infringed
right. Were the slave owner innocent in this sense, Sheila would
have to respect his interest more than her own. That position
would be plainly absurd. Probably Sheila owes no respect at all to
the interests of the master that grow directly out of the evil institution of slavery, e.g., his economic investment in her, and as to
other interests, such as life and physical security, the most that
could be argued for is that she should treat his interests as equal.
Given the magnitude of Sheila's moral right to freedom, this supposition would lead to the uncontroversial conclusion that she
would be justified in using moderate physical force if that were
necessary to escape.
One may pause to recognize that whatever the persuasiveness of
theories that citizens have a duty of social contract or fairness to
obey the law, these have no application to Sheila, who is denied
the basic rights and benefits that underlie the claimed duty. Given
her forcible removal to this society and her appalling treatment in
it, she is almost certainly justified in disregarding most consequentialist reasons for obeying the law,68 but, in any event, such reasons
would be unlikely to outweigh the reasons supporting moderate use
of physical force.
Whether Sheila can use deadly force if only her liberty, and not
her life,69 is at stake, is more troublesome, and for this it matters a
88
Even if a kind of universal utilitarianism were the most enlightened and noblest approach to take, someone might be justified, in the sense the term has been employed in this
essay, in not taking into account the interests of persons whose initial grievous wrong creates the situation in which correction of that wrong will adversely affect their interests.
Sheila may be justified in not worrying whether her escape will contribute to disruption of
the legal order of the slave-owning society, though perhaps she would need to consider if her
breaking of the law might cause harsh retaliation against fellow slaves.
89
No doubt in many situations in which escape is attempted, the escapee finds himself
in a position in which he must suffer physical injury or use physical force. In the interests of
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great deal how her relationship with the owner is viewed.
If one sees the denial of Sheila's precious right as having over-

arching significance, one may conclude that she may do what is
necessary to obtain her freedom even if that requires her to kill her
owner if he tries to stop her. Application of the principle of necessity here requires further elaboration, in relation to possible delay
and to likely success. Legally justifiable force is usually in response
to an immediate threat to rights; if force is not used at that moment, the opportunity to protect the rights will be lost. Slavery, on
the other hand, is a continuing condition. If one fails to escape
today, he may have another opportunity to escape next week. How
far does a moral notion of necessity require delay if the prospect is
that one can escape with less use of force on a subsequent occasion?70 The extreme position is that an unjustifiable deprivation of
liberty is such a grievous wrong that one may do whatever is necessary to avoid any avoidable moments of constraint. The law regarding deadly force and kidnapping may seem to give some support to this position, since a person under control of kidnappers
could use deadly force to escape at any time even if he thought
that he could escape later without use of deadly force. But the ordinary kidnapping situation involves constant insecurity about the
life of the victim and aggressors who are unambiguously wrongdoers. Given a settled pattern of loss of liberty and the decreased
level of personal moral blame ascribable to the typical slave owner,
an aspect of the moral requirement of necessity may be choice of a
moment when less force will be needed if such a moment will present an equally good chance for a successful escape.71 Likely success is not an aspect of a legally justifiable use of force in defense
of rights. Though force deployed in an obviously futile effort at
defense is in one sense wasteful, a person defending himself
against a clearly wrongful aggression cannot be expected to make
simplification, it is assumed that Sheila can submit to capture without forfeit of her life or
physical well-being.
70
A planned escape is assumed. If an unexpected good opportunity to escape presents
itself, Sheila cannot be expected to deliberate about future opportunities.
71
The argument that Sheila must consider future possibilities of escape with less force
are weakened as her escape evolves into an extended period of liberty and she must use
force to prevent recapture.
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an accurate calculation of likely success nor to submit passively
because his chances of defeating the attack are small. Moreover,
such force can help serve to deter subsequent aggressions even if it
does not stop the one at hand. If the main emphasis in the slavery
context is upon Sheila's moral rights, she should be able to do
what is necessary to acquire freedom even if the acts that she performs are highly unlikely to be sufficient to accomplish her goal.
A radically different perspective is one that sees Sheila and the
slave owner as caught up together in a grave injustice. Though
Sheila suffers much more than her owner in the present state of
affairs, he bears little personal moral blame for that condition, and
she should give considerable weight to his legitimate interests as a
fellow human being. From this perspective, Sheila would certainly
have a responsibility to choose a time for escape involving lesser
force if such a time were available, and she would also have a responsibility not to use very serious force futilely. 72 Perhaps she
would be unjustified in intentionally killing someone to achieve escape, even were that the only way she could free herself. That conclusion would not bar deadly force altogether, since some uses of
deadly force carry only a moderate risk of death, and Sheila's right
to liberty might well be great enough to warrant a risk of that sort.
One's choice between those two perspectives, or in favor of some
intermediate position, will depend partly on the gravity of the
wrong (slavery is a particularly appealing case for the rights perspective) and one's view of the relative importance of rights and of
duties of concern in a correct public morality. Much may also depend on factors that cannot be captured by abstract examples. If
the slave owner has reached out to Sheila in a caring way, as much
as that is possible in a system of slavery, she may owe his interests
more concern than if he has treated her like chattel.
Thus far it has been assumed that deadly force, if it is to be used
at all, is in response to the owner's attempt to stop Sheila's escape.
Suppose, instead, that she shoots him before she escapes so that he
will not be able to report her escape. Does it matter whether the
72
One might, of course, believe that her use of futile force was excusable, though not
justifiable, because of the desperateness of her situation.
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person against whom the force is used is, at that moment, seeking
to stop a legitimate exercise of a moral right? A reason why that
ordinarily matters is that until the moment of crisis, one cannot be
sure that a person actually will try to stop the exercise of right.
But sometimes one can be sure. Perhaps on past occasions the
owner has directly used physical force to return escapees. And
even if the owner prefers to rely on others to use physical force to
capture and return freed slaves, his very participation in the social
institution of slavery reflects his continual willingness to keep his
slaves from enjoying their moral right to liberty. Perhaps the question here really is about necessity. 73 If one can plan an escape that
will not involve deadly force, its necessary use because of unplanned fortuity differs significantly from making such force a part of
one's plan.74
When one moves from the owner to others who might try to stop
Sheila, questions about innocence and wrongdoing remain perplexing, and the law governing defense of rights provides little direct
assistance. If Sheila can use a level of force against her owner, presumably she can use the same force against those the owner specifically hires to bring her back. One might argue that as his agents,
and perhaps as members of a less aflluent social class, they are less
to blame than he, but, unlik_e the owner, they have chosen to engage themselves in the very business of catching slaves. The slave's
position vis-a-vis the owner's ordinary employees and other slaves
who help to hunt her down may be different. The employees have
not chosen to hunt slaves, that is only a small part of their responsibilities; and the other slaves are essentially coerced by the owner
into hunting down their fellows. Although those groups do
threaten Sheila's rights, they are innocent, in a stronger sense than
the owner. Ordinary citizens who may try to restrain Sheila or report her have made a choice to prevent the escape that may distinguish them from those the owner directs to participate in stopping
her, but their fringe involvement in slavery may make them less
•• It is doubtful whether necessity fully captures the intuition that reactive use of force
is easier to justify than initiation of force on a particular occasion.
" Thia difference would lessen if Sheila could be confident of making an escape in the
near future that could avoid use of deadly force.
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responsible than the owner himself. How one should regard ordinary law enforcement officials is particularly difficult. They have a
public duty to enforce the law, which happens to include slavery
and this observation suggests a low level of personal responsibility.
On the other hand, they have made a double choice: first to take
an enforcement position in which one important aspect of the law
to be enforced is evil, and second, to participate directly in the
enforcement enterprise, not only against those who break the law
without any perceived moral claim but also against those who believe a moral justification underlies their behavior. As the visible
representatives of the state that accepts slavery, the law enforcement official may in some sense assume the risk that he will be
treated as a wrongdoer if the state is a wrongdoer, and perhaps the
slave is thus justified in treating him as not innocent. Still, one
should be hesitant to take this argument too far. If the enforcement official does not recognize, and perhaps c4Jinpt fairly be expected to recognize, that the particular act ot'ehforcement is immoral, then whether he can somehow be tax~d- -with the state's
guilt because he happens to have chosen that line of work is
doubtful.
Slavery pointedly combines extreme deprivation of personal
rights with extreme deprivation of political rights. The law governing defense of rights strongly indicates that preservation of the
bundle of rights that is lost when one becomes a slave is important
enough to warrant even the taking of the life against a clearly identified oppressor. The illustration of slavery nicely shows how, even
in this context, the system of legality and the problem of assessing
responsibility can influence the dimensions of a moral right to use
physical force, and it begins to suggest some of the limits to analogies drawn from legal justifications for force.
Similar considerations apply to the more complex situations in
which the claims of denial of moral rights are more uncertain and
debatable, and the deprivations plainly less severe.

480

[Vol. 32

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

2. Deprivations of Moral Rights That Do Not Result From

Systematic Injustice
Imprisonment

-

Unjustified Executions and

In the example of slavery the legal system perpetrates a great
wrong that denies fundamental moral rights. But one can be the
victim of a serious deprivation of moral rights at the hands of the
law without any systematic injustice, because of the wrongful acts
of an isolated individual or because of simple misfortune.711 The
question for this section is whether illegal force may justifiably be
used against officials to prevent them from enforcing such a
deprivation.
Peter finds himself the innocent victim of a wholly unwarranted
conviction that will, if he submits, result in his execution or imprisonment. Must he, as Socrates thought in The Crito, 76 submit to
punishment or has he a moral right to avoid it? If he can avoid it,
may he use physical force?

I

Someone who intentionally subverts the administration of justice by planting false evidence or suborning perjured testimony
against someone he knows to be innocent patently violates that
person's rights. If a public official engages in this conduct, an agent
of the government is a wrongdoer in an obvious sense. The victim,
as a participating member of a just society, may have a moral responsibility (based perhaps on a duty of fair play or some loose
notion of social contract) to pursue all possible channels of legal
redress before relying on self-help, but in some cases those channels will not prove fruitful, most typically because the kind of injustice to which the victim has been subjected is not discoverable
by official bodies capable of correcting the error. What may the
victim permissibly do if these possibilities of review have failed or
are foreclosed?
One may begin with a stark, but unrealistic example. A sheriff
has framed Peter for a murder the sheriff knows he did not com16
Even if natural causes, like disease, do not deprive one of a moral right to life, the
usage here assumes that an innocent person is deprived of a moral right to liberty, if other
humans intentionally, but without any wrongdoing, take away that liberty.
16
PLATO, The Crito, in PLATO SELECTIONS 34-50 (B. Jowett trans., R. Demos ed. 1955).
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mit. Peter has been convicted and sentenced to death. Shortly
before the execution is to take place he has a chance to escape, but
can do so only if he assaults, or kills, the sheriff, who is his present
custodian. Peter has no legal right to escape at this point, since he
is in the lawful custody of the sheriff. If the execution takes place,
however, the sheriff will be morally, and legally, a murderer. One
might draw a distinction between the sheriff as subverter of justice
and the sheriff as lawful custodian. So far as the concern is the
physical integrity or life of the sheriff, that distinction is artificial.
If Peter can save his life by using force against the sheriff, the ordinary notion of a moral right of self-defense against an unwarranted aggression should comfortably extend to this situation, and
that would be so even if Peter must kill the sheriff. Though escaping and assaulting and killing the sheriff will be a kind of rejection
of the authority of the state, asking Peter to give up his life when
he knows the, state's claims are grounded in plain error is asking a
great deal.
Deadly force against the sheriff -would be harder to justify if Peter were merely escaping from imprisonment, instead of from execution. An unjustified sentence of imprisonment may later be rescinded, and even were that prospect dim, imprisonment
predictably comes to an end. Reference to justifiable force against
kidnappers might suggest that deadly force may be used to prevent
an unjust deprivation of liberty, but this example highlights a reservation expressed earlier. The rule permitting deadly force in response to kidnapping does not reflect a general moral view that
every unjust deprivation of liberty warrants such force. Peter's
strongest claim to use deadly force would be in the case of a very
long prison term, which he might analogize to a kind of long-term
slavery.

In normal circumstances, the custodians, or those who seek to
capture an escaped prisoner, will not be the same persons who bear
responsibility for the wrong. Not only are they not blameworthy,
they do not have the data which would allow them to identify the
penalty as grossly unjust. Further, they are not merely innocent
people who happen to pose a threat to the victim; they are persons
performing necessary public duties; they owe an obligation to soci-
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ety to carry out the penalty that has been imposed. In one sense
they are innocent aggressors rather than bystanders; their actions
do pose a threat to Peter's moral rights. But since they have acted
with complete appropriateness, their interests probably deserve
the consideration the law accords to the interests of bystanders.
The magnitude of the wrong Peter would otherwise suffer may be
sufficient to justify moderate physical force to assure his freedom,
but deadly force against wholly innocent officials may be precluded
even if Peter's execution is the alternative.
When fortuitous error, such as sincere mistaken identification or
substantial evidence of guilt that happens to be misleading (as in
Dostoyevsky's Brothers Karamazov), produces a conviction of an
innocent person, the analysis is essentially similar. Here no one,
no private individual or state official, has injured the victim, but
the innocent victim has nonetheless suffered a wrong. His obligations toward the state and toward innocent officials seem very
much the same as if some single person, official or private, had
intentionally framed him. As in that case, the government as a
whole, and its custodial agents in particular, are carrying out a sentence that appears to be fully justified from their point of view but
which the victim himself knows to be unjustified.
Sometimes injustices result from the actions of high government
officials (trials of leading party members during the Stalin era, for
example) or from pervasive biases or preferences (say in favor of
whites against blacks) shared by virtually all government officials.
These are intermediate cases between the legalized injustice of
slavery and the isolated instance of injustice suffered by Peter. As
those who subvert the legal system of justice come closer to being
the major representatives of the state or as the biases increase both
in intensity and in the weight they are given, we come nearer to
situations in which the government qua government is depriving
one of rights.
3. Political Action to Protect Rights
Instead of directly asserting a right, a person can use political
force against government officials to get them to stop violating a
moral right or in order to replace them with new officials who will
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recognize the right. Often political action gives greater promise of
securing a right than attempts at direct assertion. Moreover, some
rights, such as the right to a fair share of state services, are not of
the kind that can be directly asserted because they require some
active participation by the government, not just its noninterference. Political action is also necessary when the basic right is one
held against other private citizens, and the aim is to correct the
government's failure to protect the right against private violations.
Political actions to protect rights range from entirely legal techniques (petitions, speeches, etc.), nonforcible illegal techniques
(peaceful trespass, burning draft cards, etc.), moderate uses of
force (assaults, occupation of buildings and denial of entry to
others, etc.), major uses of force (bombings, kidnappings, political
assassinations, etc.), to full scale warfare, as in armed revolutions.
The basic problem for this section is whether political action that
includes physical force can be justified.
The law of defense of rights is not a great deal of help in this
respect. The actions that it sanctions bear a much closer relation
to direct assertion of rights than to acts designed to persuade or
coerce government officials to make particular choices. Although
some personal rights, such as a right to liberty, that might occasion
political action are also of concern to the law authorizing use of
physical force, other rights, such as a right to a fair share of services or to political equality, are not the sorts of rights dealt with
by the law treating defense of rights. Occasionally political activists have claimed the defense of general justification, arguing that
their apparently illegal acts were necessary to stop a great evil,
such as American participation in the Vietnamese War. These
claims have enjoyed little success, foundering on the judgments
that the connection between the act performed and evil to be
avoided lacks the required immediacy, that a necessity to engage
in forcible illegal action has not been shown, and that challenges to
government policies are not encompassed by the defense. 77
Certainly, the law creates no right for private persons to use
physical force against others to correct injustices - an employee
77

See, e.g., ·United States v. Kroncke, 451 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1972).
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may not destroy his boss's property in order to get a fair wage.
The absence of any legal right of this kind may reflect a moral
judgment that such methods are not appropriate. Any society tries
to structure private relations so that conflicts can be resolved without the use of force. The boss cannot bring physical force to bear
against his employee, and the employee's use of force is deemed an
improper response to whatever wrongs the boss has inflicted. In
respect to private relations, the force of the state stands as a sort
of neutral arbiter. This, no doubt, is an oversimplification, but I
shall not discuss what the effect of the necessary qualifications
would be on the morally justifiable use of force against private
organizations.78
When the dispute is between the state and some of its members,
no neutral arbiter exists. The state possesses a monopoly of relevant legal force. In such circumstances, the argument that aggrieved citizens may be morally justified in using force to combat
or dislodge the force of the state that is denying their rights has
greater plausibility than in the private context. The law can provide some vague guidance about some sorts of rights for which
such force may be appropriate, and that guidance can be supplemented by reference to history, or more precisely normative judgments about historical events. The principle of necessity has relevance to when force may justifiably be used, though that principle
must be understood in a looser sense than it has in the law.
I have suggested, drawing support from the law of justifiable
force, that moderate force is certainly warranted to escape from
slavery, and that deadly force, at least against some persons, may
be warranted as well. If such force is justified against those who
directly constrain the slave, would not such force be justified
In some societies an employer's economic power may be so great or the government's
support of the prevailing social class so strong that physical force on behalf of the disinherited may appear a necessary and morally justified means for righting some "private" wrongs.
Michael Walzer makes such a suggestion about some union employment of force. M.
WALZER, Civil Disobedience and Corporate Authority, in OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDI•
ENCE, WAR AND CITIZENSHIP 24 (1970). Even if one does not object to the role of the state or
believe that a private organization has excessive power, he may believe that on certain occasions physical force is warranted to achieve a change in the policy of the private organization. One thinks, for example, of force used against university administrations.
78
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against those who make and execute the laws that support constraint? No simple answer can be given to this question because
some features of political action make justifying such force seem
easier, whereas others make it seem more difficult.
Those who actually have power to alter prevailing law and practices within embedded social institutions may seem more blameworthy for what exists than private individuals who take advantage of the existing rules. Those who are politically responsible
may have less of a claim of innocence than those who own slaves,
though even as to them, a moral assessment of blame cannot disregard social conditioning and prevailing cultural patterns. In many
circumstances, political action may hold out greater promise of
success than individual assertions of right, and success, if it comes,
will rectify multiple violations of rights. On the other hand, the
fruits of particular political action can rarely be confidently predicted, and the point at which escalation from peaceful to forcible
action is needed can never be precisely fixed.
The initial brunt of most forcible political action falls on lesser
officials, mostly police officers and military personnel, and whether
they can fairly be treated as wrongdoers is troublesome. Many
kinds of forcible political acts, moreover, are bound to harm innocent bystanders. Finally, forcible political action may be much
more disturbing to a social order than direct assertions of rights.
Perhaps people, like slaves, suffering the most extreme deprivations of right need not take this last consideration into account,
but it may affect what others with a greater stake in the system
should do.
I shall return briefly to some· of these special problems for justifying forcible political action, but at this point we can place the
moral rights that may be directly asserted by force in the category
of rights for which forcible political action may be warranted. Our
culture's judgment on its own history suggests that certain political
rights also qualify.
Two major armed attempts at secession have been experienced
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in our history, the War for Independence and the Civil War. 79 The
initiators of both struggles relied heavily on claims that the government in power was denying their rights. A striking feature of
both struggles is that, whatever the rhetoric may have been, the
actual denials of rights giving rise to claims to found new political
units were not nearly as extreme as others we have witnessed or
can imagine. Those who sought independence had not been
marked for extermination, or enslaved, or arbitrarily imprisoned,
or denied liberty of movement, or imposed upon by an alien culture, or forbidden to worship as they chose, or foreclosed from expressing political opinions. The judgment of history has been
kinder to the moral justifications advanced in 1776 than to those of
the Confederacy, in part no doubt because the victors write history
and because few countries sustain an ideology that includes origination in injustice, but also because the participatory republican
sentiments of the American Revolution are now almost universally
accepted and the institution of slavery, to which the South's complaints of unfair treatment was linked, is now universally abhorred.
In any event the American Revolution must make one cautious
about claiming that only the most extreme abuses can justify
armed insurrection, since its generating complaints were about inadequate political participation accompanied by harsh economic
measures. If one makes the judgment that the Revolution was justified, as most Americans are inclined to do, he must acknowledge
that gross (and widespread) denials of political participation and
systematically harsh and unfair treatment can legitimate forcible
political action. so

In one sense, armed military struggle seems the ultimate degree
of force for the assertion of political rights; and indeed it is the
degree of force that will almost certainly cause the greatest damage
to life and property. One is tempted to say that a cause serious
•• The possible argument that the Confederate States had a legal right to secede and
that it was th~ federal government's forcible response that was in violation of law is pnssed
over.
•• Neither the Revolution, nor this phrasing, settle whether those who have full formal
participation may use force because they are victimized by an oppressive majority. As important as formal participation is, its absence should not be regarded as an absolute condition of forcible political action.
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enough to justify military action is serious enough to justify lesser
forms of force, and such a conclusion would be fundamentally
sound with respect to such matters as forcible occupation of buildings or destruction of P,roperty. But how is one to judge a more
selective use of deadly force, such as political assassination or terrorism directed at civilians, as an alternative? Many persons flinch
at such tactics even when they deem military struggle defensible. If
one searched for some rational grounding to these sentiments, he
might point to the general destabilizing effect of assassinations and
random terror, and to the insecurity that results when killing by
stealth is approved.
The comparative difficulty of mounting armed insurrection
might also be regarded as a kind of check on the seriousness of an
underlying cause, a check that would not exist were these other
techniques accepted as legitimate tactics. Further, a successful
armed struggle may be much more likely to lead to desirable
changes than sporadic killing. The comparative acceptance of
armed struggle may also be influenced by other factors, whose relevance from a rational point of view is more dubious. Because the
army is viewed as an agent of the government for the purpose of
fighting, killing soldiers may seem more appropriate than killing
other persons associated with the government. However, the cogency of that attitude is questionable, especially when soldiers are
draftees. A sense may also exist, perhaps shared by many participants, that open conflict is more honorable than stealthy murder.
This view of the use of physical force probably has salutary effects
on human relations generally, but it may also serve the interests of
the powerful people who occupy positions of social authority, at
the expense of the relatively inarticulate and powerless individuals
who constitute the most vulnerable class in armed conflicts.
Whatever may be the case when one is trying to assert a moral
right against an individual who is directly violating that right, the
grave consequences of armed struggle on innocent and guilty alike
suggest that it can not be justifiably undertaken unless other less
violent alternatives would fail, there is a reasonable prospect of
success, and the harms likely to be caused are not disproportionate
to the good likely achieved. The traditional just war doctrine which
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demands of the actor some morally sensitive weighing of costs and
benefits, has application to the justification of armed struggle
within a society,81 and indeed to any forcible political action with
substantial effects on the innocent. In this transmuted form, the
general principle of necessity for defense of rights and the balancing of consequences required by the general justification defense
have relevance to the moral evaluation of forcible political action.
Attempts to make political points often raise the question
whether one should submit to punishment. That issue is not involved in legal justifications for force and it has little relevance to
attempts to assert directly the individual moral rights discussed. If
one's aim is to overthrow the government, the issue also does not
arise, or has only tactical significance. (Conceivably the jailing of a
popular figure would contribute to public opposition to the regime.) The issue does have an important moral dimension when
the effort is to attain political change from the government presently in power. Submission to punishment represents a kind of
statement that in the final analysis one is willing to submit to the
authority of the government; it thus tempers one's initial defiance
of the law and the resentment and insecurity that defiance may
cause. One thinks of the issue of submission mainly as linked to
nonforcible violations, but those who use physical force against
particular officials or fellow citizens may also have moral grounds
for then placing themselves at the disposition of the government.
This action might seem odd because the choice to use force may
appear to be a determination not to recognize bonds that tie one in
obligation to the government. One can imagine, however, instances
in which people use force against particular officials deemed viciously corrupt or brutal, or use moderate force against those who
81
See generally Wells, Is "Just" Violence Like "Just" War?, 1 Soc. THEORY & PRAc.
26 (1970).
Perhaps a distinction should be drawn between secession supported by the vast major•
ity of the population and an effort to overthrow a government. When a political subdivision
attempts to secede, the first use of force may come from the larger political entity seeking to
preserve its hegemony, though, even then, the secessionists' force is hard to classify as defensive. More important, secessionists do not try to tell others how they should live and be
governed, they only seek to remove themselves from an existing political authority; those
who overthrow a government (at least one with fairly broad support) are, in effect, dictating
to all the citizens of that government.
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implement a challenged social policy (such as the extension of civil
nuclear power), but who also wish to show their willingness to accept the ~ettled judgments of the community.
B. Defense of the Rights of Others
Individuals defending the moral rights of others may also believe
it is necessary to break the law. Of course, when a group engages in
political action, those seeking to protect their own rights will also
be trying to protect the rights of other participants, and, almost
always, of nonparticipants suffering similar violations of right. But
the situation here is one in which someone whose rights are not
being violated is concerned with combatting the denial of rights to
members of another group. A clear example would be white abolitionists who opposed slavery. One might take the view that when
the government systematically denies the rights of one group of
citizens, it denies the rights of all. This proposition is premised on
the idea that people have a right to live in a just society and the
lack of justice or evil inevitably poisons those who are not directly
injured. Though some truth lies in this observation, it disregards
the special and much more severe wrong that is done to the injured
class. Thus, one is left with the problem whether persons not in
that class have the same moral privilege to use force on behalf of
members of the class as do the members of the class themselves. 82
The problem, with two important variations, closely resembles
its analogue in interpersonal relations. What was discovered in
that context was a movement toward assimilation of the victim's
privilege to use force to that of the intervenor. The traditional resistance to that correspondence was, as suggested earlier, perhaps
based, in part, on the belief that an intervenor has a greater responsibility to consider the overall effects of his actions than a vie82
More complex intermediate cases in which the intervenor's original assistance is
peaceful - he hides runaway slaves - and his need to use force arises only when he is
threatened for giving peaceful assistance, or when others intrude on his property to discover
if he is doing so, or when others attempt to capture persons who have relied upon his assistance, are passed over. In the first two instances, one might view his use of force as opposing
a denial of his own rights, including his right to offer nonforcible assistance to those whose
moral rights are denied. In the last case he may have a responsibility to use force based on
his undertaking to the slaves relying on his help.
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tim. Both these points have apparent relevance to the moral justification for forcible illegal intervention on behalf of moral rights.
One important variation between that inquiry and the one about
legal justification concerns the kinds of rights involved. Much more
often than with respect to physical security of persons and property threatened by immediate attack, the kinds of moral rights
that governments deny can be fully vindicated only with the active
involvement of the victims themselves.83 Generous help by outsiders may not be an adequate substitute for self-help. In most instances, perhaps, this concern would affect the relative roles of victims and intervenors in the struggle for rights rather than the
possibility of any outside help.
The second important variation concerns the intervenor's ties to
other members of the society. Some of the victim's moral reasons
for obeying the law may be largely undercut by the violation of his
rights. If the violation is virtually total, as in the slavery example,
the slaves owe nothing to the government or to members of the
society as such, though they may have universally applicable moral
responsibilities to all humans that bear on whether they should
obey the law. Intervenors such as abolitionists, on the other hand,
have the rights and privileges of other citizens, including the possibility of participation in political processes. The injustice to another group may not relieve them of the responsibilities they may
have as full citizens. Though these responsibilities may sometimes
rule out their engaging in tactics that would be appropriate for
members of oppressed minorities themselves, these responsibilities
will not necessarily bar all illegal aid or even all forcible illegal aid,
if the moral justifications for giving such aid somehow outweigh
the reasons for fulfilling one's obligations as a citizen to obey the
law.
C.

Punishment

As far as the law is concerned, formal punishment of adults, involving serious physical force, is the exclusive province of the government. The law of justification thus provides no suggestion that
83

See Richards, supra note 30, at 433.
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private persons may appropriately punish adults in this way. The
criminal law as a whole does, however, establish the importance of
punishment as a social institution, and that premise may be used
to argue that private infliction of punishment is sometimes warranted from a moral point of view.
The claim may be that state machinery has failed so badly, because of weakness or corruption, that private individuals must undertake state functions of punishment. During the colonial era,
when no organized police force existed, the line between government and private citizens was much less distinct than it is now.
Mobs, often led by respected public citizens, ventured outside the
strict limits of legality with some frequency to enforce public ideas
of justice, and on some occasions they did so with the acquiesence
of local officials.84 Those thinking and writing about political matters conceived a much more active role for the citizenry in this respect than any it would be accorded now. This perspective may
suggest that the weaker a government is, the more easily one can
justify private illegal actions that undertake to perform functions
like punishment that ordinarily belong to the government. A similar conclusion may apply when government officials are so corrupt
that they regularly decline to proceed against wrongdoers for reasons that are wholly improper. 811 Even in circumstances of weakness or pervasive corruption, however, private vigilantism is
fraught with social dangers, creating risks of private feuds, a generally increased level of violence, and further breakdown of government authority. Very strong reasons in favor of action will be required to overcome its likely harm.
One might argue that the law generally assumes a government of
reasonable strength and honesty, and that the law governing justification cannot be taken as reflecting any implicit moral judgment
that private punishment is wrong when these conditions are not
met. Such an argument is much more difficult to make in the other
' See generally J. REID, IN A DEFIANT STANCE (1977); Maier, Popular Uprisings and
Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century America, 27 WM. & MARY Q. (n.s.) 3 (1970).
80
If the corruption is subject to correction by the political process, that alternative
would appear preferable to meting out private punishment to those who have profited from
8

the corruption.
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kinds of situations in which private punishment is contemplated.
In one, the state is working moderately well, but ample proof is
simply unavailable that a particular person committed a crime. To
take an extreme case, suppose that illegally obtained evidence irrefutably establishes guilt, but cannot be used at trial. Is a private
citizen ever warranted in such a situation in taking the law "into
his own hands"? Here, the law as a whole does make the judgment
that private action is improper, and the community interest in orderly processes and a state monopoly over serious punishment is
stronger than when the government is weak or corrupt.
The second sort of situation involves settings of close interpersonal relations that members believe should be carried on without
state intervention. Brothers of a frequently beaten wife might believe themselves morally justified in beating up the husband in return, supposing that such action would be more productive than
invoking public processes, and not accepting the law's demarcation
of public and private power for this situation. Though the law
protects family relations in other aspects, no moral justification
can be drawn from it for this behavior. The best the proponents of
such private physical force in these two kinds of settings can do is
to contend that the law's preclusion is stricter than prevailing, and
correct, moral views, and that its rigidity is to be explained in
terms of misjudgment or administrative simplicity.

E. Indirect Protection of Rights and Promotion of Desirable
Consequences
Force may be used against governments with an aim to achieve
more widespread recognition and fulfillment of moral rights or to
achieve other desirable consequences. The rather sharp line drawn
in this essay for the sphere of interpersonal use of force between
direct protection of rights and indirect protection of rights does
not exist for political action, though that action can be focused on
one particular right or a large number of rights and it can be aimed
at officials who are more or less to blame for rights violations. The
previous discussion of forcible political action, including armed
struggle, to defend one's own rights or the rights of others, reaches
most of what could relevantly be said under this subheading, the
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major point being that moral justification of such political action
depends, as does the general justification in law, on a careful
weighing of benefits against harms.

It is appropriate here to inquire briefly how far justifications for
forcible political action need to rest on assertions of right rather
than claims about general welfare. The discussion is not easy, because the rhetoric of armed struggle has traditionally been a rhetoric of rights, and moral rights are now very much in fashion. Those
who use force against a government will inevitably be accused of
violating rights, and they understandably will wish to cast their
own activities in terms of protecting and promoting even more important rights.
Recognizing the immense complexity of trying to talk about
what a government believes or intends, one might oversimplify
some possible situations in the following way: (1) the government
realizes that it is denying moral rights but is willing to do so in the
interests of the powerful social class it represents; (2) the government intends the consequences that others characterize as a denial
of rights but honestly disputes that characterization (e.g., the government supports slavery but regards slavery as benign); (3) the
government follows a policy that it believes will have beneficial
consequences but that others think will be destructive of vital interests such as life (e.g., the government thinks civilian nuclear
power is safe; critics disagree); (4) the government recognizes the
desirability of better satisfaction of vital interests but does not
know how to contribute to that end (e.g., it understands the disastrous effects of sharp inflation but thinks it is impotent to stop
inflation by any acceptable techniques).
In the first situation the government is a wrongdoer in the most
obvious sense. Whatever greater latitude to use force exists because a person or organization is intentionally violating rights is
present here. In the second situation, the government may be less
blameworthy (at least if its own moral position is not outrageous),88 but it is intentionally doing just what others consider to
88
The holding of some moral positions may itself be the basis of condemnation. One is
not inclined to view the Nazi who thought it morally right that Jews be killed more favora-
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be a violation of rights. Action against the government can still be
based on the claim that it is violating rights. When one reaches the
third and fourth situations, the claim of rights violation is much
more dubious. Opponents of civilian nuclear power may think millions of lives will be lost because of the government's misguided
policies, but the ordinary notions of right and violation imply
something more than the unfortunate consequence of a mistaken
policy judgment, and they also imply something more than the actual helplessness or ineptitude revealed by the fourth situation. 87
In these situations, the opposition's claim, "We are acting to protect rights," could be more neutrally put as, "We are acting to protect vital interests that will be sacrificed if the government does
not change." The "rights" claim to use illegal force in this case, is
really then not distinguishable from a claim that rests simply on
desirable consequences, except insofar as it highlights the importance of the interests that are at stake.
Cases, of course, will never be as simple as the situations suggested. Opponents of government policies will be able to point to
indifference, corruption, inappropriate priorities, and other matters as bases for blaming officials even when no intention exists to
violate rights. But thought about these problems would be aided if
the distinction between misjudgment and wrongdoing were
acknowledged.
The general justification defense permits forcible action to protect important interests whether or not the threat to those interests derives from human wrongdoing, and whether or not the harm
that would otherwise be suffered would be a violation of rights.
The broadest versions of the defense permit even the taking of innocent lives to protect a greater number of other lives. The implicit moral judgment underlying these versions would extend to
justify forcible political action producing a net balance of favorable
bly than the Nazi who recognized that killing Jews was morally wrong but was willing to kill
them anyway.
•• One might conceivably say that any deprivation of vital interests as a consequence of
human error represents a violation of rights. Under this usage, if a person dies because his
brakes have failed, his right to life has been violated if a mechanic made an error in repairing the brakes, but his right to life has not been violated if no human action caused the
failure. This usage stretches too far the ordinary connotations of violations of rights.
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consequences. Those who protect rights against violators directly
may have a sort of moral privilege to disregard many of the interests of the wrongdoers. 88 However, if no one is really a wrongdoer,
then the interests of all must obviously be taken into account.
Some of the more narrow formulations of the defense preclude
justification for the intentional talcing of innocent life. If such action is always morally wrong, an important limit is set on the kinds
of forcible political action that may permissibly be taken on the
basis of a government's faulty judgment or ineptitude alone.89 In
any event the broad lesson of the general justification defense
would appear to be that some force at least may be used against
the government if its errors are very severe and affect people's vital
interests, and if this use of force holds out a substantial promise of
changing things for the better in a way that could not be achieved
by nonforcible action.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The main aim of this essay has been to discover the moral assumptions underlying the law of justifiable force and to use these
to assess illegal acts of force. That assessment provides at least one
very important basis for thought about correct moral judgments on
these matters.
Though some conclusions can be confidently drawn, many issues
are marked by uncertainty. Sometimes the difficulty lies in decid. ing what, if any, moral assumption can be drawn from the laws.
Many of its boundaries are to be explained mainly in terms of administrative necessity and its acceptance of certain behavior may
be more a grudging concession to ordinary behavior than approval.
Sometimes the difficulty is irresolution in the law itself, lack of
88

This is the reason why deciding who is a wrongdoer and whether innocents will be
harmed are so important to justifications for forcible protection of rights.
89 The principle that innocent lives should not be intentionally taken would also rule
out random terrorist killing as a tactic even when the aim is to correct violations of precious
rights. The principle is also a source of concern if the direct objects of deadly force are to
be police or military personnel who may not be responsible for violations of right. In traditional just war analyses soldiers are distinguished from innocent civilians, and one might
argue that for domestic insurrection soldiers and police acting on behalf of a wrongdoing
government are effectively wrongdoers.
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clarity about what the law in a particular jurisdiction provides or
divergence among jurisdictions. Further problems are created by
the shift in inquiry from legally justified force to illegal force.
Analogies are drawn between the two in terms of the rights that
generate force, the nature of force used, and the necessity for force,
but these analogies are not always close. Even when the analogies
are close, the special feature of breaking the law may significantly
affect moral judgment. Plainly a person developing his own view
about when illegal force is justified will have to resolve a. great
many questions as to which the law provides very little guidance.
This essay has not referred explicitly to the legitimacy of governments, and one conclusion that may fairly be drawn from this exercise is that justification for illegal acts, even illegal acts of force,
will not always depend on whether the government is legitimate, in
general or in respect to the persons using force. 00 Still, the nature
of a government can be of crucial importance for whether illegal
force is warranted in ways only hinted at here. In brief, the greater
the political participation and freedom in a society, the stronger
will be the moral claim that obedience is owed to fellow citizens,
the more dubious will be assertions that forcible action alone can
accomplish reform, and the weightier will be concerns that widespread force will undermine a government that is reasonably just.
If one places a high value on liberal democracy, and realizes that
serious physical force is usually damaging in both short and long
term effects, and if one, in particular, believes as I do, that liberal
democracy is hard to maintain when that force is used with any
frequency against the state, he will conclude that the use of physical force against such a government is rarely justified.
Is there a right to violence? My answer is that in some circumstances the use of serious physical force is morally justified. In relatively common situations the law approves the use of such force,
moral judgment largely coinciding with legal permission. In more
unusual circumstances illegal physical force may be employed in a
morally justifiable manner, though justification for serious physical
This distinction is drawn because one might suppose that a slave-owning democracy
is a legitimate government with respect to its citizens but not with respect to slaves held by
the citizens.
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force that is illegal will rarely be available in a liberal democratic
society that recognizes its members as equal and functions with
reasonable effectiveness.

